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ARTICLES 
PROCEDURAL TRIAGE 
Matthew J.B. Lawrence* 
 
Prior scholarship has assumed that the inherent value of a “day in 
court” is the same for all claimants, so that when procedural resources 
(like a jury trial or a hearing) are scarce, they should be rationed the same 
way for all claimants.  That is incorrect.  This Article shows that the 
inherent value of a “day in court” can be far greater for some claimants, 
such as first-time filers, than for others, such as corporate entities and that 
it can be both desirable and feasible to take this variation into account in 
doling out scarce procedural protections.  In other words, it introduces and 
demonstrates the usefulness of procedural triage. 
This Article demonstrates the real world potential of procedural triage 
by showing how Medicare should use this new tool to address its looming 
administrative crisis.  In the methodological tradition of Jerry Mashaw’s 
seminal studies of the Social Security Administration, this Article uses its 
in-depth study of Medicare to develop a theoretical framework that can be 
used to think through where and how other adjudicatory processes should 
engage in procedural triage.  This Article concludes by applying this 
framework to survey other potential applications for procedural triage, 
from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hearings are a scarce resource in many administrative and judicial 
processes.  Budgets are too tight, claim volumes are too high, and hearings 
are too costly to afford to give every claimant the full measure of 
procedural justice.  So we have to ration the procedural protections that we 
provide to claimants. 
We usually treat all claimants alike in rationing process.  We might 
compromise the procedures we give to every claimant across the board, 
providing everyone the sort of second-best opportunity for participation that 
Judge Friendly called “some kind of hearing”1 and Jerry Mashaw called 
 
 1. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1275 (1975). 
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“bureaucratic justice.”2  Or we might screen out frivolous or low-stakes 
claims regardless of who brings them or why,3 rationing process based only 
on a claim’s likelihood of success and magnitude as provided by the often-
criticized Mathews v. Eldridge4 test.5 
Our reliance on a one-size-fits-all approach to distributing scarce 
procedural protections among claimants makes sense only if either (1) the 
value of process in a particular case depends only on the claim at issue—its 
magnitude or merit or stakes—not the claimant who brings it; or (2) there is 
no normatively permissible and cost-effective way to direct heightened 
procedural protections to those claimants for whom such protections have 
most value.  Scholars have assumed one premise or the other,6 with limited 
exception.7 
 
 2. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:  MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 1 (1983). 
 3. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (federal amount in controversy requirement); Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that federal courts should dismiss 
civil actions that do not present “plausible” allegations of fact).  We do, occasionally, use 
claimant identity as a proxy for case merit.  For example, prisoner petitions are subject to a 
special exhaustion requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (2012). 
 4. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 5. Id. at 335 (setting out a three-part test for determining whether administrative 
procedures satisfy the Due Process Clause).  This test has come under attack for being 
focused exclusively on accuracy to the exclusion of other values, most prominently, the 
inherent value of participation. See, e.g., Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine 
“Enemy Combatant” Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 393 n.348, 414 
(2006) (criticism of Mathews attacks “its single-minded focus” on cost-effective promotion 
of accuracy to exclusion of other values). 
 6. Most analyses do not recognize the possibility that the inherent value of participation 
could vary from claimant to claimant. See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (proposing a method for including inherent value of 
participation in distributing procedural protections that does not address variations among 
claimants); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:  Toward a More Responsive 
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 160–77 (1978) (same); see also 
Glen O. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1481, 1503 (1992) (“If there is a due process right to individualized adjudication, it must be 
in recognition of an equal right enjoyed by other, similarly situated claimants.”); cf. Brendan 
S. Maher, The Civil Judicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L.J. 1527, 1547–49 (2010) (proposing a 
method for including inherent value of participation in distributing procedural protections 
that addresses only variations in claimants’ liquidity).  Some scholars have noted the 
possibility of variation but nonetheless assumed that the inherent value of participation is the 
same for all claimants due to the difficulties of tailoring. Compare I. Glenn Cohen, 
Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 289 (2013) (recognizing that the 
inherent value of participation might be greater “for the downtrodden”), with Maher, supra, 
at 1647–49 (stating in light of the complexity of tailoring, modeling inherent value of 
participation with a “fixed ‘dignitary participation bonus’” assigned equally to each potential 
claim). See also Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication:  Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV 561, 630 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication] (noting the possibility of variation but assuming uniformity); Robert G. Bone, 
Rethinking the “Day in Court Ideal” and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 288 
(1992). 
 7. In a footnote, David Rosenberg notes the possibility of variation and proposes to 
address it by charging claimants a fee for the full cost of procedural protections. David 
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure 
Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 256 n.110 (1996).  Problems with this solution are presented 
infra Part IV.C.1.  Gillian Hadfield laments scholars’ failure to differentiate among 
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This Article demonstrates that both premises are flawed.  Through a 
study of Medicare’s adjudicatory process for resolving disputes about 
coverage of particular treatments and services, which is currently facing a 
multi-year backlog of claims,8 this Article demonstrates that the inherent 
value of process—the value that comes from giving a claimant her “day in 
court,” win or lose9—can vary from claimant to claimant and that we can 
take advantage of that variation in distributing scarce procedural 
protections.  In so doing, this Article builds a framework for identifying 
whether and how other administrative and judicial processes should ration 
process among claimants according to need. 
This Article’s primary contribution can be understood at two levels of 
generality.  For Medicare in particular, this Article offers a timely and novel 
way of responding to a growing administrative crisis that has sparked two 
congressional hearings and two federal lawsuits, left many providers 
struggling to stay in business, and threatened patient access.10  For the 
 
claimants in designing adjudicatory processes, Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and 
Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation:  Differences Between Individual and 
Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 
1280 (2004), but does not address the differing value of process to different claimants or 
how procedures might be designed to take advantage of that variation.  Finally, some have 
followed Marc Galanter’s distinction between “haves” and “have nots” to suggest that 
procedures be varied depending on the identity of claimants. See generally Marc Galanter, 
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 95, 144 (1974).  But Galanter’s call, and those that have followed it, do not 
explore variation in claimants’ capacities to benefit from participation as a reason for 
procedural specification.  Instead, such efforts focus on claimants’ varying abilities to use 
particular procedures to maximize their chances of success, which can raise accuracy and 
inequality concerns. See id. at 98 (noting advantages of repeat players over one-shot 
players); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 79, 103 (2008) (explaining that there are different rules for institutional players 
differently able to game the system); Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs:  Reflections on the 
Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV 1369, 1397 (2005) [hereinafter Galanter, Planet 
of the APs] (citing the same proposition); Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-
Making and Appeal Procedures:  Can Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical 
Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1461, 1510–11 (2003) (supporting separate rules for 
providers because they are better able to use adversarial process); Judith Resnik, Precluding 
Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 622 (1985).  Such efforts do not amount to procedural 
triage, because any differential treatment of claimants is not based on differences in the 
inherent value of process to those claimants. 
 8. See Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), Medicare Appellant Forum 
(Feb. 12, 2014) (PowerPoint presentation on file with author) [hereinafter OMHA 
PowerPoint]. 
 9. “Inherent value of participation” here means the benefit (or cost) of process qua 
process, “standards of value by which we may judge a [participatory] legal process to be 
good as a process, apart from [results].” Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving 
Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1974); see infra 
Part II (discussing three theories of process value). 
 10. See Lessler v. Burwell, No. 3:14-CV-1230 (D. Conn. Oct. 9, 2014); Complaint, Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-00851, 2014 WL 2532049 (D.D.C. May 22, 2014); 
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads:  Hearing Before the U.S. H. Comm. 
on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care & Entitlements, 
113th Cong. (2014); STAFF OF S. COMM ON AGING, 113TH CONG., IMPROVING AUDITS:  HOW 
WE CAN STRENGTHEN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS (Comm. Print 
2014) [hereinafter IMPROVING AUDITS]. 
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design of adjudicatory processes in general, this Article’s study of Medicare 
introduces the possibility of rationing process among claimants based on 
the inherent value of participation to particular claimants—“procedural 
triage” for short11—demonstrates the usefulness of this new tool, and 
provides the basis for an exploration of its potential. 
Procedural triage is this Article’s primary contribution, but this Article 
also makes three additional, secondary contributions.  First, it argues for the 
first time that the dignitary interest in procedural justice differs for natural 
persons and corporate entities.12  Second, it incorporates the inherent value 
of participation in the costs and benefits it considers;13 for the most part 
systemic analyses of adjudicatory design have excluded this value.14  Third, 
it advances the longstanding argument about when to sacrifice participation 
for efficiency in the adjudicatory process,15 by showing that when process 
is scarce and its value varies among claimants, procedural triage can be 
used to build an adjudicatory process that is less participatory for some, but 
more efficient and more participatory overall.16 
Part I offers background on the administrative process for making 
Medicare coverage determinations, the use of hearings as a cog in that 
process, and the malfunction in that cog evidenced by Medicare’s lengthy 
backlog of appeals.  The multi-year backlog is expected to grow to more 
than one million claims.  In addition to hurting claimants, the backlog now 
threatens healthcare access, quality, and cost for Medicare beneficiaries.  
Providers allege they are scrambling to stay in business while they wait on 
unpaid claims, threatening patient access, and the Department of Health and 
 
 11. In medicine, “triage” has come to mean “the sorting of and allocation of treatment to 
patients . . . according to a system of priorities designed to maximize the number of 
survivors.” Triage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).  This Article uses the 
term “procedural triage” to describe its proposal to sift among claimants in distributing 
procedural protections based on their capacity to derive inherent benefit from those 
protections. 
 12. Infra Part II.B; cf. Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1011, 1013, 1027 (2010) (“calling for more scholarship on procedural rights” and 
pointing to the question of whether corporations have dignitary interest in procedural 
justice). 
 13. Infra Part IV. 
 14. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1187 
n.33 (2013) (presuming the “only welfare-relevant” outputs of adjudicatory process are 
transaction cost and accuracy); see also Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in 
Adjudication:  An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 382 (1994) (“[I]n most 
instances, the nature of the [inherent value of participation] is not very well defined, and its 
grounding is uncertain.  This makes application in concrete contexts and evaluation of trade-
offs quite difficult.” (footnote omitted)). But see Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 6 
(including inherent value of participation in analysis). 
 15. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:  A Double Play on 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 48–49 (2010); Alexandra D. Lahav, 
The Law and Large Numbers:  Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 383, 400 (2007). 
 16. Infra Parts III, IV.C.4. 
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Human Services held important quality control efforts in abeyance pending 
a solution.17 
Part II surveys the three prevailing theories of the inherent value of 
participation—the psychological theory, Jerry Mashaw’s dignitary theory, 
and Lawrence Solum’s legitimacy theory18—to establish that the inherent 
value of process can vary from claimant to claimant.  For example, in 
Medicare, an individualized hearing to reconsider a denial of coverage for a 
motorized wheelchair has significant inherent value when it gives the 
satisfaction of having been heard to a frustrated beneficiary, win or lose.  
But it has much less inherent value, if any, when provided to a wheelchair 
manufacturer that routinely appeals hundreds of denied claims each year 
simply in order to maximize revenue.  Yet provider appeals make up 85 
percent of Medicare’s appeals workload.19 
Part III begins by explaining that the variation identified in Part II is 
insufficient, without more, to make the case for procedural triage in 
Medicare or any other process.  The simple fact that the value of 
participation varies does not mean that participation is not worthwhile for 
every claimant.  And the background commitment to procedural justice 
reflected in most debates about adjudication (and in Medicare’s 
administrative process itself) makes it normatively problematic to sacrifice 
potentially worthwhile participatory protections for no other reason than to 
create efficiency. 
So, Part III identifies process scarcity as an additional boundary 
condition to procedural triage.  Where process is scarce, the question is not 
whether to sacrifice participation for efficiency, but instead how best to 
sacrifice participation, opening the door to claimant-based rationing.  Part 
III concludes by explaining that procedural protections are indeed scarce in 
Medicare and evaluates and rejects potential alternative solutions to the 
backlog. 
Part IV then uses a behavioral economic analysis to show that procedural 
triage is not just theoretically desirable as a response to Medicare’s 
backlog—as demonstrated in Parts II and III—but actually feasible.  It 
begins by identifying five considerations that affect the feasibility of any 
means of rationing process among claimants—effect on the accuracy of the 
administrative process, participation value, effect on claimants’ primary 
behavior, transaction cost of the administrative process, and legality.  It 
 
 17. See Complaint, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-00851, 2014 WL 2532049 
(D.D.C. May 22, 2014) (alleging that providers’ viability is threatened by backlog); 
IMPROVING AUDITS, supra note 10 (describing how recovery audit contractor audits are held 
up due to backlog). 
 18. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
(2002) (psychological theory of inherent value of participation); MASHAW, supra note 6, at 
177–80 (dignitary theory of inherent value of participation); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 277 (2004) (legitimacy theory of inherent value of 
participation). 
 19. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., IMPROVEMENTS 
ARE NEEDED AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE LEVEL OF MEDICARE APPEALS 8 (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 OIG REPORT]. 
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then shows how Medicare could ration process without interfering with the 
accuracy of its administrative process by splitting its adjudicatory process 
into two tracks:  one optimized for efficiency and the other optimized for 
participation.  Specifically, it shows how Medicare could reduce costs on 
the “efficiency” track by sacrificing participation, not accuracy, and that by 
selectively sifting claimants into this track, Medicare could generate a 
savings to put toward improved procedural protections for claimants in the 
“participation” track. 
Part IV concludes by proposing and evaluating libertarian, paternalistic, 
and behavioral approaches to procedural triage.20  The potential value-
added of libertarian approaches is limited by market failures that distort the 
demand for process,21 and the potential value-added of paternalistic 
approaches is limited in ways Part IV discusses by our lack of precise 
information about the inherent value of participation to particular claimants.   
So, Part IV concludes that the safest way to ration process among 
claimants, in Medicare at least, would be to use a hybrid, “asymmetrically 
paternalistic” behavioral approach.22  Because the Medicare claimants who 
tend to benefit most from a hearing also are the most likely to be 
susceptible to behavioral biases, the behavioral approach could leverage 
status quo bias (the behavioral tendency to follow the default) and other 
softly-paternalistic measures to sort claimants based on their capacity to 
benefit from procedural protections. 
Finally, Part V synthesizes and generalizes the framework for deciding 
when and how to engage in procedural triage developed through this 
Article’s study of Medicare in Parts II, III, and IV.  It then employs this 
framework to identify other adjudicatory systems where procedural triage 
could be worthwhile, from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to federal 
court.  It points out that administrative processes that feature a wide and 
lumpy (multi-modal) assortment of claimants (like Medicare) are the best 
candidates for procedural triage.  And it presents the novel possibility of 
using claimant-based procedural triage rather than claim-based summary 
judgment as a way to ration access to a jury trial in federal civil 
proceedings.  Finally, a brief conclusion is offered. 
 
 20. The terms “libertarian” (or “choice-based”) and “paternalistic” (or “mandatory”) 
here are intended to invoke the evolving debate in the normative behavioral economics 
literature on utilizing and evaluating regulatory tools based on their capacity to respect 
choice. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its 
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1286 (2014); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for 
Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian 
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (2003). 
 21. Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 IND. L. J. 1429 (2015). 
 22. The default rule that this Article proposes would be “asymmetrically paternalistic” 
because it would act like a mandate for those who are subject to status quo bias, but as a 
choice for those who are not. See Camerer et al., supra note 20, at 1211; George 
Loewenstein et al., Asymmetric Paternalism to Improve Health Behaviors, 298 J. AM. MED. 
ASSOC. 2415, 2416 (2007). 
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I.  MEDICARE’S ADMINISTRATIVE CRISIS 
Like any entitlement program, Medicare’s administrative task is 
ultimately to determine eligibility for and distribute taxpayer dollars.  The 
administrative task for Medicare is complicated, however, by the fact that 
each recipient’s entitlement is tied not to a precise statutory formula, but 
instead to a standard that implicates professional judgment.  Beneficiaries 
are entitled to coverage for all medical care they receive that is medically 
“reasonable and necessary.”23  That decision is initially made by doctors, 
not bureaucrats, which creates an administrative challenge for the Medicare 
program.24 
Medicare attempts in various ways to control the decisions of these 
doctors, who ultimately dole out a larger fraction of our gross domestic 
product than do the consumer markets for electronics, apparel, and furniture 
combined.25  Many of these efforts, which are in an important sense 
healthcare rationing efforts,26 are implicit.  For example, Medicare 
incentivizes hospitals to cut costs by compensating them on a per-patient 
basis.27  And the accountable care organizations created by the Affordable 
Care Act are intended to encourage doctors to cut costs by giving them a 
share of the resulting profits.28 
There are ethical29 and instrumental30 limitations to Medicare’s ability to 
ration care implicitly, however.  As a result, Medicare also attempts to limit 
 
 23. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 24. Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats:  Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101 
GEO. L.J. 519, 522 (2013). 
 25. In 2012, Medicare accounted for $572.5 billion in spending. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES FACT SHEET 2012 (2013) 
[hereinafter EXPENDITURES FACT SHEET 2012], http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-
Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-
Sheet.html [http://perma.cc/H9EL-DEU9].  In the same year, Americans spent $216 billion 
on apparel (including clothing and shoes), $197 billion on furniture, and $103 billion on 
consumer electronics. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 
2012 2 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann12.pdf [http://perma.cc/B2N8-HRTC]. 
 26. In light of the political sensitivity of the word “rationing,” Mark Hall self-
consciously uses the term “medical spending decisions” rather than “rationing decisions” in 
his book-length treatment of the subject. MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING 
DECISIONS:  THE LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 3–4 (1997).  
Persuaded by Maxwell Gregg Bloche that transparency here will improve discourse in the 
long run, MAXWELL GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH:  WHY DOCTORS ARE UNDER 
PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL 
59 (2011), this Article uses the term “rationing” above to describe efforts to forego 
healthcare that someone thinks could possibly benefit the patient.  So understood, rationing 
is already commonplace in our healthcare system. See id.; HALL, supra, at 5 (“[W]e have 
always rationed health care resources on a massive scale.”).  Note, on this point, that even 
“wasted” care may be somewhat beneficial—or be thought to have been before it was 
delivered. See Bagley, supra note 24, at 536. 
 27. Ching-to Albert Ma, Health Care Payment Systems:  Cost and Quality Incentives, 3 
J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 93, 94 (1994) (describing prospective payment system). 
 28. Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research As Choice Architecture:  The 
Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
523, 543 (2014). 
 29. Gregg Bloche argues that implicit rationing violates the doctor’s Hippocratic oath. 
BLOCHE, supra note 26; see also DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH:  
2015] PROCEDURAL TRIAGE 87 
spending explicitly, especially on nonemergency big-ticket items like 
hospital admissions, long-term care, and motorized wheelchairs.31  The 
process by which Medicare does so—by refusing coverage even for doctor-
recommended care—is known as “utilization review.” 
Medicare hires private contractors to perform utilization review on the 
more than one billion claims for coverage that it receives each year.32  
These contractors are empowered to deny payment for treatments and 
services that are excluded by Medicare payment rules or that they 
themselves deem not to be medically “reasonable and necessary.”33 
In some cases, utilization review in Medicare is prospective—that is, it 
happens before care is delivered.34  Usually, though, Medicare utilization 
review is retrospective, happening after delivery.  Either the beneficiary 
submits a claim for reimbursement or the provider does so, having taken 
“assignment” of the claim as a condition of service (a provider that takes 
assignment of a claim cannot charge the beneficiary if the claim is denied).  
In practice, the vast majority of claims are submitted by providers.35 
Whether performed prospectively or retrospectively, utilization review 
significantly affects Medicare claimants.  Its direct effect is usually to make 
a claimant pay for healthcare herself.  Its indirect effect is to influence the 
ex ante healthcare choices of beneficiaries and especially providers who 
make treatment decisions in the shadow of utilization review.36  These 
 
MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 145 (2001) (arguing that 
physicians should make rationing decisions explicitly); KEITH SYRETT, LAW, LEGITIMACY 
AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE:  A CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 58–
63 (2007) (discussing reasons we should ration explicitly, including informed consent and 
individual autonomy). But see id. at 55–58 (discussing arguments in favor of implicit 
rationing, including social stability and minimization of “denial disutility”). 
 30. Implicit efforts to encourage rationing can cause significant distress to patients and 
the public when they come to light, as the managed care experience in the 1990s made very 
clear. See generally Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Patients’ Attitudes Toward Cost Control 
Bonuses for Managed Care Physicians, 20 HEALTH AFF. (MILLWOOD) 186 (2001). 
 31. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Prior Authorization for Power Mobility Device (PMD) 
Demonstration, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,439, 46,439 (Aug. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Medicare Program] 
(expanding prior authorization requirement). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 33. Id. § 1395y(1)(A)(1); id. § 1395kk-1(a)(3). 
 34. E.g., Medicare Program, supra note 31, at 46,439; Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare 
and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1517 (2005) (prior 
authorization in Medicare Part C). 
 35. See infra Figure 1. 
 36. For example, when Medicare recently began retrospectively reviewing hospital 
admissions more closely, hospitals responded immediately by denying new patients inpatient 
admission on the margins. Zhanlian Feng et al., Sharp Rise in Medicare Enrollees Being 
Held in Hospitals for Observation Raises Concerns About Causes and Consequences, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 1251, 1251 (2012).  According to allegations from some consumer and 
provider advocates, Medicare went too far, so hospitals did as well, leading hospitals to deny 
thousands of beneficiaries hospital admission that would have helped them, for fear of a 
subsequent denial of coverage. See Bagnall v. Sebelius, No. 3:11cv1703 (MPS), 2013 WL 
5346659 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom., 
Barrows v. Burwell, 77 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2015); Mary D. Naylor et al., Unintended 
Consequences of Steps to Cut Readmissions and Reform Payment May Threaten Care of 
Vulnerable Older Adults, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1623, 1627 (2012). 
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effects have increased since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
which instructed Medicare to limit spending by stepping up its efforts to 
scrutinize claims, both through fraud and abuse enforcement,37 and through 
utilization review.38 
By statute and constitutional mandate,39 Medicare offers an adjudicatory 
process everywhere that it subjects doctors’ treatment recommendations to 
utilization review and a way to appeal decisions denying coverage to a de 
novo hearing before an independent Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  This 
ALJ appeal is the first and last “litigant persuasion opportunity” in the 
Medicare coverage appeals process, in Judith Resnik’s terms.40 
The composition of Medicare’s appeal workload, like that of its 
claimants, is dominated by provider-filed appeals.  As shown in Figure 1 
below, as of the Office of Inspector General’s 2012 Report, 11 percent of 
appeals were filed directly by beneficiaries challenging an adverse coverage 
determination, with the remaining 89 percent filed by either providers (86 
percent) or state Medicaid organizations (3 percent) (state Medicaid 
agencies often appeal a denial of Medicare coverage for a dual-eligible 
beneficiary because if Medicare refuses coverage, the Medicaid agency 
must pay).  Providers include hospitals, nursing homes, durable medical 
equipment manufacturers (such as the now-defunct “Scooter Store” famous 
for its ubiquitous mid-day television commercials), and practitioners.41  The 
subject matter of appeals varies widely; disputes reflect disagreements 
about a patient’s need for a motorized wheelchair, inpatient hospital 
admission, off-formulary drugs, home health or rehabilitation services, 
particular treatment (such as bariatric surgery or sex change surgery), and 
so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37. See generally Julie E. Kass & John S. Linehan, Fostering Healthcare Reform 
Through a Bifurcated Model of Fraud and Abuse Regulation, 5 J. HEALTH LIFE SCI. L. 75 
(2012). 
 38. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6411, 
124 Stat. 119, 773 (2010). 
 39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 
(1982); Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 755 (D. Ariz. 1996). 
 40. Resnik, supra note 7, at 607–09.  The appeals process features three steps prior to an 
ALJ hearing but the ALJ hearing is de novo and the first opportunity for a live hearing 
before an adjudicator who is functionally independent from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 931(b)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2398 (2003).  Furthermore, while 
the ALJ’s decision may be appealed to federal district court, the district court sits in an 
appellate capacity, giving the ALJ substantial deference. Arruejo v. Thompson, No. CV-00-
2402(JG)(SMG), 2001 WL 1563699, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 3, 2001); Bosko v. Shalala, 995 
F. Supp. 580, 582 (W.D. Pa. 1996). 
 41. 2012 OIG REPORT, supra note 19, at 24. 
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Figure 1:  Percentage of Appeals Filed by Type of Appellant42 
 
At a hearing, a claimant offers testimony to the ALJ about the medical 
condition at issue, the symptoms and history of the patient whose coverage 
is in question, and the usefulness of the treatment or service provided in 
support of written submissions.43  Opposing views may usually be offered 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) or the contractor 
who denied the claim, at their discretion.44  Like other administrative 
processes, the procedures are designed so that claimants can proceed with 
or without representation.45 
Pursuant to regulation and policies adopted to reduce costs, hearings are 
held by telephone with only rare and “extraordinary” exception.46  Claimant 
representatives have argued that this practice violates the Medicare statute, 
which they read to guarantee an in-person hearing.47 
As a check on utilization review, itself a primary means by which 
Medicare ultimately makes decisions about what to cover, Medicare’s 
coverage appeals process plays a major role in the formation of Medicare 
policy through the piecemeal adjudication of claims.  “Medicare coverage 
decision-making and appeals processes are the venues in which the battle 
 
 42. This data reflects the composition of Medicare’s appeal workload as reflected in the 
2012 OIG Report.  Insofar as increasing appeal rates result predominantly from increases in 
provider appeals, the fraction of provider appeals has likely increased since. 
 43. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1030 (2014). 
 44. Id. §§ 405.1010, 1012.  Opposing views may not be presented in a hearing requested 
by an unrepresented beneficiary. Id. § 405.1012(a). 
 45. 2012 OIG REPORT, supra note 19, at 3. 
 46. Under “extraordinary circumstances” a hearing can be held in one of the four cities 
hosting Medicare ALJs. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1020(b). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012); CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, WHEN IS A HEARING 
NOT A HEARING? (2013), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/old-site/News/Archives/Reform 
_InPersonHearings.htm#_edn2 [http://perma.cc/6EBN-86N8]. 
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over program costs, and ultimately the future design and content of the 
Medicare program, will play out.”48 
Unfortunately, Medicare’s coverage appeal process is broken.  As 
mentioned above, in the Affordable Care Act and other enactments, 
Congress instructed the CMS to step up its scrutiny of wasteful Medicare 
claims.49  It has done so, saving the taxpayers billions in the process.50  But 
that savings comes out of the pockets of providers and patients, who are 
having their claims denied increasingly often.  At the same time, more 
beneficiaries are entering the Medicare program as the baby boom 
generation enters retirement.51  Combined, these factors have led to a 
dramatic and steady uptick of appeals, totaling 545 percent in recent 
years.52 
Under this new state of affairs, Medicare’s Office of Hearings and 
Appeals is not capable of providing a hearing to every claimant who wants 
one.  In 2013, for example, as shown in Figure 2, Medicare claimants filed 
appeals of decisions denying coverage four times faster than Medicare’s 
ALJs could hear them. 
 
Figure 2:  Medicare Appeals Filed and Appeals Decided53 
 
 
 48. Kinney, supra note 7, at 1511. 
 49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6411, 
124 Stat. 119, 773 (Mar. 23, 2010); Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 
2010, Pub. L. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (July 22, 2010); see also Exec. Order No. 13,520, 74 
Fed. Reg. 62,201 (2009) (entitled “Reducing Improper Payments”). 
 50. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE 
RECOVERY AUDIT CONTRACTORS AND CMS’S ACTIONS TO ADDRESS IMPROPER PAYMENTS, 
REFERRALS OF POTENTIAL FRAUD, AND PERFORMANCE 1 (2013) (reporting $1.3 billion 
savings in FY 2010 and 2011 from one audit program). 
 51. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals Workloads:  Hearing Before the United 
States H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Health Care & 
Entitlements, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) (statement of Chief Judge Nancy J. Griswold) 
[hereinafter Griswold Statement], http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
CMS-Griswold-OMHA-Final.pdf (discussing “increases in the number of beneficiaries 
utilizing services covered by Medicare”) [http://perma.cc/B48Z-PBVG]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. OMHA PowerPoint, supra note 8. 
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As a result, at the beginning of 2014, half a million appeals and counting 
were waiting for a hearing (the federal courts process fewer civil cases in a 
year), and that number grew throughout the year, with no end in sight.54  In 
July 2014, the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals began to 
implement measures that it hoped would alleviate some of the backlog, 
such as a pilot project to try statistical sampling in limited cases and efforts 
to prioritize beneficiary appeals in line.  Such efforts, though, “are 
insufficient to close the gap between workload and resources” in the 
hearing process.55  Related efforts by the CMS to settle a significant block 
of cases in the backlog that resulted from a particular change in hospital 
billing rules also will be insufficient either to bring capacity in line with 
demand or clear the backlog.56  Meanwhile, appellants have filed suit 
seeking to compel swifter resolution of claims,57 pointing to the statutory 
mandate of a decision in ninety days.58  Something has to give. 
II.  THE INHERENT VALUE OF PROCESS VARIES  
FROM CLAIMANT TO CLAIMANT 
The significant differences between Medicare claimants, who range from 
represented providers to pro se beneficiaries, presents a question:  In light 
of the ongoing backlog, should Medicare treat claimants differently in 
deciding how to distribute its procedural resources? 
If the inherent value of process is the same for all claimants, as prior 
scholarship has assumed, then the answer is no.59  If process is equally 
valuable for every claimant, then there is no reason to consider the inherent 
value of participation for particular claimants in distributing procedural 
protections and no value to be gained by doing so. 
This part argues that the inherent value of process does vary from 
claimant to claimant.  The parts that follow build on this insight to show 
that it is both desirable and feasible for Medicare to take this variation into 
account in distributing scarce procedural protections. 
A preliminary note:  one of the challenges in assessing the inherent value 
of participation to particular claimants is that proceduralists have not come 
to a consensus about why being heard at a hearing or through another 
participatory process has value beyond its affect on the possibility of a 
 
 54. Id.  The backlog was expected to reach a million claims by the end of 2014. Id.  On 
January 8, 2015, the author submitted a request through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) for precise 2014 year-end data. FOIA Request 15-0320 (Jan. 8, 2015) (on file with 
author).  The agency has indicated that it is processing that request. E-mail from OMHA to 
author (Jan. 13, 2015) (on file with author). 
 55. Griswold Statement, supra note 51, at 6. 
 56. See Reed Abelson, Medicare Will Settle Short-Term Care Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
30, 2014, at B1; Inpatient Hospital Reviews, CMS.GOV (Sept. 17, 2014), 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-
FFS-Compliance-Programs/Medical-Review/InpatientHospitalReviews.html 
[http://perma.cc/HL9Q-579S]. 
 57. Complaint at 1–2, Am. Hospital Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 14-cv-00851, 2014 WL 
2532049 (D.D.C. May 22, 2014). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012); 42 C.F.R. 405.1016 (2014). 
 59. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 237. 
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winning outcome.  Instead, there are multiple normative theories of the 
inherent value of participation that take different routes to that conclusion.  
Because these views are not mutually exclusive, this section applies each of 
the three leading sorts of theories in identifying reasons a hearing may tend 
to be more inherently valuable for some Medicare claimants than others.  
These are:  (1) psychological theories, which see participatory process as a 
way to generate acceptance (or, in economic terms, satisfy a “preference for 
fairness”); (2) dignitary theories, which see participation in a decision 
affecting an individual as required to maintain the dignity of that individual; 
and (3) legitimacy theories, which see participatory process as uniquely 
able to confer normative legitimacy on an adverse decision.  The 
subsections that follow address these theories in turn. 
A.  Psychological Theories 
The psychological theory of the inherent value of participation has a long 
pedigree.  Justice Frankfurter joined Frank Michelman and Richard Saphire 
in seeing in participatory process the power to “generat[e] the feeling, so 
important to a popular government, that justice has been done,”60 and long 
before that one of the earliest legal scholars wrote that “[a] good hearing 
soothes the heart.”61 
The specific nature of the inherent value of participation on the 
psychological theory has been modeled by economists, most prominently 
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness Versus Welfare, 
as its capacity to satisfy a “taste for a notion of fairness.”62  Some people, 
the story goes, have a preference for fair treatment, just as one might have a 
preference for bread or beauty.63  A process that such a person perceives to 
be fair creates value by satisfying that preference for fairness.64  A 
supplement to this approach models the value of participation not as 
satisfying a preference for fairness, but instead as soothing a person’s 
negative emotional reaction to an adverse event, which may entail altering a 
preference.65 
On a psychological theory, the inherent value of procedural protections 
varies fairly obviously based on a claimant’s emotional investment in his or 
 
 60. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims 
in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS:  NOMOS XVIII 126, 127 (J. Roland Pennock & 
John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (“[A] participatory opportunity may also be psychologically 
important to the individual.”); Saphire, supra note 6, at 124–25 n.59 (“[T]enants, consumers, 
and welfare recipients often regard the way in which they are treated by governmental 
institutions at least as importantly as the extent to which they achieve their substantive 
goals.”). 
 61. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:  The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (1981) (quoting “The Instruction of Ptahhotep”). 
 62. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 21 (“[I]ndividuals have a taste for a notion of 
fairness, just as they may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine.”); see Rosenberg, supra 
note 7. 
 63. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 21. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Lawrence, supra note 21. 
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her appeal (and sensitivity to soothing or aggravating interventions).  A 
claimant’s emotional stake in his or her appeal is difficult to measure 
directly, but there are qualities in the Medicare claimant population that 
tend, all else being equal, to indicate greater or lesser emotional investment. 
First, the nature of the claimant matters because certain claimants are 
intuitively less likely to be emotionally invested in their appeals.  It is much 
easier to tell a story of why an elderly beneficiary could be emotionally 
invested in her appeal than it is to tell the same story about a provider 
appealing on assignment.  Similarly, it is easier to tell a story of why a solo 
practitioner or doctor in a small practice group could be invested in her 
appeal (her professional judgment is in question) than it is to tell the same 
story about a case manager working for a major hospital or wheelchair 
manufacturer who, at year’s end, selects and pursues appeals on behalf of 
the business.  A corporate entity itself has “no independent psychological 
experience.”66  Employees, partners, or owners (in a closely held 
corporation) might have a psychological stake in a corporation’s appeal, so 
the fact that an appeal is brought by such an entity does not entirely vitiate 
the possibility of inherent psychological value.67  But corporate status is 
nonetheless an indication that the inherent psychological value of 
participation is attenuated, all else being equal. 
Second, a claimant’s motivation for appealing may provide a window 
into her emotional stake, in this sense:  a claimant motivated purely by 
money is less likely to have an emotional stake than a claimant motivated 
also (or only) by principle, because such a claimant is less likely to perceive 
an unfairness (either in the first instance or in the decision on appeal).  
While a claimant’s motivation also is hard to know, it stands to reason that 
any factor tending to indicate that an appeal is positive value (worth filing 
in a monetary sense) or that an appellant has a lower cost of identifying and 
pursuing such positive-value appeals will tend to indicate diminished 
emotional stakes.  So, again, providers are better equipped to learn about 
and understand the appeals process than beneficiaries.  This makes them 
better equipped to identify and select appeals that are likely to succeed and 
therefore to be able to appeal in the ordinary course of business. 
For the same reason, we can expect repeat filers, on average, to derive 
less inherent psychological benefit from process qua process because it is 
more likely they are motivated by money.  This is so because repeat players 
necessarily have a greater familiarity with the appeals process—how to 
appeal, how the process operates, and so on.  It stands to reason that it is 
therefore less likely they will take a denial in a particular case as an affront.  
And it also lowers the marginal cost of appealing (because no upfront 
investment in learning how to do so is required), making it logically more 
likely that a repeat player files appeals in the ordinary course of business.  
 
 66. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts, 63 HASTINGS LAW J. 127, 148 (2011) (“[A]n entity represented by an agent simply 
cannot, as a definitional matter, have any perceptions of procedural justice; it is an entity, 
with no independent psychological experience.”). 
 67. Id. 
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In fact, while it is easy to assume that beneficiary appeals are automatically 
brought at least in part for principled reasons,68 some beneficiaries may 
themselves be repeat players who appeal as a matter of course for whom the 
stakes of an appeal are purely monetary.69 
Comparing these factors to the Medicare claimant pool shows that 
participation value in the Medicare appeals process varies markedly.  For 
example, as shown in Figure 2 above, the provider/beneficiary split is very 
pronounced in Medicare, where most claimants are sophisticated providers 
and beneficiary appeals represent only a small percentage.  Furthermore, 
claimants’ repetition in bringing appeals also varies a great deal.  In fiscal 
year (FY) 2010, one-third of appeals were filed by ninety-six providers, 
who filed between fifty and 1050 appeals each.70  Some of these providers 
appealed every denial they received.71 
B.  Mashaw’s Dignitary Theory 
Many scholars believe that participation has inherent value because it 
affirms the dignity of an individual by giving her a say in a decision 
affecting her life.  Jerry Mashaw’s articulation of this dignitary theory, 
expressed most directly in “Due Process and the Administrative State,”72 is 
“perhaps the most influential and well-developed.”73  Notwithstanding this 
prominence, the question whether this dignitary value varies from claim to 
claim, including whether corporations have “dignity” of the sort that makes 
procedural rights inherently valuable, has not been explored.74 
 
 68. Individual litigants outside of Medicare report in surveys that their reasons for suing 
were principled—that “it is not about the money!” See, e.g., Tamara Relis, “It’s Not about 
the Money!”:  A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 
701, 702 (2006).  Those self-descriptions are consistent with empirical observations of 
claiming behavior. Fredrick Dunbar & Faten Sabry, The Propensity to Sue:  Why Do People 
Seek Legal Actions?, 42 BUS. ECON. 31, 36–41 (2007); Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue 
in England and the United States of America:  Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. 
& SOC’Y 400, 417–19 (1991); David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice 
Claiming Behavior in Utah and Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250, 253–55 (2000). 
 69. See, e.g., Posting of Traci to Insurance Has Denied Coverage for Growth Hormone, 
CHILDREN WITH DIABETES (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:55 PM) [hereinafter Children with Diabetes 
Forum], http://forums.childrenwithdiabetes.com/showthread.php?70915-Insurance-has-
denied-coverage-for-growth-hormone (“Appeal, appeal, appeal.  Let me tell you, they killed 
a whole forest of trees with their denial letters when I had premature triplets in the 
NICU . . . they denied routine things for all kinds of crazy reasons.  I learned to 
appeal . . . early and often.”) [http://perma.cc/7MAA-ESCW].  That a beneficiary seeks 
appeal strategically does not mean that he or she does not have a deeply emotional interest in 
the treatment being paid for. 
 70. 2012 OIG REPORT, supra note 19, at 8. 
 71. Id. at 9. 
 72. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 45.  Mashaw had developed the view expressed in that 
book in a series of earlier articles. See id. (listing articles). 
 73. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 
436 n.115 (2008). 
 74. The moral status of corporate entities has been explored in other contexts, however. 
See generally Galanter, Planet of the APs, supra note 7 (providing overview of discussion of 
legal and moral status of corporate entities).  And, as discussed above, Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff has addressed the psychological benefit of procedural justice to corporate entities. 
See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 66, at 147–49. 
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Although Mashaw’s theory is sometimes described as deontological, it is 
ultimately instrumental.  To Mashaw, process has value qua process by 
virtue of the capacity of participation to “nurture[]” deontological dignitary 
values “such as autonomy, self-respect, or equality.”75  So, on Mashaw’s 
theory, the degree to which process has inherent value in a case is a 
function of the degree to which it furthers a person’s “autonomy, self-
respect, or equality.”76 
Mashaw sees variation from case to case on this theory based on the 
degree to which the questions presented implicate a person’s dignity.  The 
ultimate issue is the extent to which a decision is being made about a 
person’s life, in which he or she therefore deserves partial authorship.  For 
example, Mashaw sees a much greater dignitary stake in a custody 
determination based on a person’s fitness to be a parent than in a food 
stamp entitlement determination based on formulaic application of an 
income threshold.  The former case is truly “about” the person’s life and 
directly implicates the appellant’s dignity, whereas the latter is more a 
routine application of law to objective facts and implicates a diminished 
dignitary stake notwithstanding the importance of the outcome to the 
claimant.77 
Although Mashaw does not recognize it, this same reasoning points to 
variation from claimant to claimant, not just claim to claim.  First, the 
dignitary interest in participation in an appeal brought by a corporate entity 
is diminished as compared to an appeal brought by an individual.  While 
corporate entities may be treated as persons for purposes of the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses,78 they do not 
possess a dignitary interest of the sort that gives procedural protections 
inherent value.79  Mashaw, and others who have written about the dignitary 
theory of procedural justice, repeatedly connect it to humanity and to 
personhood.80  As Justice Marshall put it, borrowing the words of Lawrence 
 
 75. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 162. 
 76. Id.  Consistent with this characterization, Mashaw cites with approval the following 
statement from Edmund Pincoffs’ analysis of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564 (1972):  “Participation may be instrumentally valuable, but instrumental to the 
achievement of a moral purpose that is itself impossible to describe in instrumental terms, 
the purpose of treating a man not as a mere means but as an end in himself.”  Edmund Lloyd 
Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS:  NOMOS 
XVIII 172 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977), quoted in MASHAW, supra 
note 6, at 191. 
 77. See generally MASHAW, supra note 6. 
 78. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (free 
exercise rights of corporate entities); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876, 885 (2010) (free speech rights of corporate entities). 
 79. The analysis here is addressed to whether corporate entities have a dignitary interest 
in procedural justice, not whether corporations are persons in the abstract or for other 
purposes.  As such, it follows the largely functional, piecemeal approach to analyzing the 
status of corporations reflected in American law. See Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Body, 
Incorporated, 87 TUL. L. REV. 457, 469–73 (2013) (contrasting legal decisions conferring 
particular rights on corporate entities with broader debate about corporate personhood vel 
non). 
 80. MASHAW, supra note 2, at 162 (referring to “values inherent in or intrinsic to our 
common humanity”); id. at 163 (“[I]t is commonplace for us to describe process affronts as 
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Tribe, the right to participation comes from the “elementary idea that to be a 
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done 
with one.”81  A corporation is a “thing” rather than a person in this limited 
sense; unlike a person it has no right to vote,82 can be lawfully owned, and 
may be destroyed, created, or cut to pieces with the stroke of a pen. 
Therefore, an appeal brought by a corporation can further dignitary 
values only insofar as the process offered in the case furthers the individual 
dignity of the corporate employees involved in the appeal.  The extent to 
which this is so will depend on the extent to which such persons may (or 
may not) come to have their identity bound up with that of the corporation.  
As a result, the dignity implicated by an appeal on behalf of a two-person 
partnership, or small closed corporation long owned by the same family, 
may tend to be greater than the dignity implicated by an appeal on behalf of 
a publicly-traded corporate entity, which may be more attenuated.  In any 
case, corporate status—and the nature of the corporations’ connection to its 
constituents—is a source of variation on a dignitary understanding of the 
inherent value of participation. 
Similarly, a claim brought by a provider on assignment from a 
beneficiary raises a diminished dignitary stake, because the person whose 
deservedness for healthcare we are deciding is not actually present in (and 
has no interest in) the appeal.  Thus, the fact of assignment means that the 
issue at stake in a provider appeal is not whether the claimant is entitled to 
healthcare, but rather who should pay for healthcare that the provider 
already decided to provide to the beneficiary.  So a provider appeal is more 
analogous to a subrogation action about who will bear liability than it is to 
an ordinary benefit decision about an individual’s entitlement to a benefit in 
the first instance.  The provider may have a dignitary stake by virtue of its 
financial interest—or the fact that the provider’s medical judgment is being 
questioned—but such an appeal does not implicate the claimant’s dignity as 
directly as a beneficiary-appeal. 
Indeed, the more routine a claimant’s appeal, the less it is a decision 
about his or her life and the more it is a routine business transaction.  For a 
claimant who appeals numerous claims as part of its business, the appeals 
process performs a primarily administrative function; in Mashaw’s terms, it 
is “implementation of previously determined values.”83  For such a process, 
 
somehow related to . . . our not being taken seriously as persons.”); id. at 164 (“The issue 
is . . . whether the challenged process sustains or diminishes an appropriate conception of 
human dignity.”); Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to Be 
Heard:  The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 449, 457 (1974) (“By 
asking to hear from litigants and listening to them, the ‘system’ is treating them with a 
dignity consonant with their self-image as human beings.”). 
 81. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 103 n.15 (1978) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 503, § 10-7 (1978)). 
 82. Mashaw analogizes the right to procedural justice to the right to vote. MASHAW, 
supra note 2, at 163. 
 83. Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative 
Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181, 188 (1981). 
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a focus on administrative efficiency rather than fairness is appropriate.84  
But for a claimant motivated by principle—who views her own appeal as 
unique—the process is better understood as performing a “value defining” 
function that does trigger a dignity interest, and with it a need for 
participation.85  As a result, the factors that tended to indicate greater 
inherent value on psychological theories do so under a dignitary theory as 
well.86 
C.  Solum’s Legitimacy Theory 
Several scholars have articulated a vision of the inherent value of process 
based on the legitimizing effect that participation has on a disappointing 
decision.87  Lawrence Solum offered an understanding of this view in 
Procedural Justice88 that has, in a short time, earned the attention of a 
number of proceduralists.89 
In Solum’s view, the inherent value of process comes not only from its 
psychological effect but also from its capacity to give decisions normative 
legitimacy.  “[A] core right of participation is essential for the [normative] 
legitimacy of adjudication.”90  By “normative legitimacy,” Solum means 
something more objective than “the legitimacy that is required for the 
important social goods of voluntary compliance and social stability.”91  And 
it is not based solely on the dignitary value of participation for the 
individual.  Rather, to Solum, normative legitimacy is desirable because it 
creates “content-independent obligations.”92  Or, to be more precise, a 
procedurally “just” decision-making process transfers the obligatory power 
of a “just” (but necessarily general and therefore ambiguous) substantive 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 206–07 (“The question of appropriateness of the mode of proceeding must be 
addressed from a perspective that considers . . . the dominant and subsidiary substantive 
goals of a program.”); see also id. at 208 (“[T]he Court would have done better to rest its 
distinction between the overpayment and fault determinations on grounds relating to 
appropriate models of justice.”); id. at 211 (“[T]he basic question is not which technique is 
more accurate, but which is more appropriate to the question to be resolved.”). 
 86. To be sure, Mashaw sees the inherent value of participation as a “political” value 
rather than a “psychological” value—he cares about a person’s dignity whether they do or do 
not. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 171 (“We are not exploring what processes make people feel 
dignified or have self respect.”).  But he nonetheless sees dignity as connected to a person’s 
experience and state of mind. Id.  In this way, dignitary value can be “a question about 
individual psychology,” even if the value is by nature political rather than psychological. Id. 
 87. E.g., Resnik, supra note 7, at 609 (participation as way of “providing the dialogue 
prerequisite to compulsion”). 
 88. Solum, supra note 18, at 275. 
 89. E.g.,  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justices in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 
WAKE FOR. L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (citing Solum); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural 
Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 765 (2011) (same); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 23, 1, 23 (2009) (same). 
 90. Solum, supra note 18, at 274. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 278. 
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law into a particularized judgment that binds the parties to it, 
notwithstanding the inevitability of error.93 
Solum’s theory of procedural justice is of little independent use in 
assessing the value of participatory process in Medicare (and whether it 
varies from claimant to claimant).  First, Solum’s theory does not apply to 
the procedures that govern the administration of benefit determinations.  
With an eye to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,94 Solum offers a 
theory of the qualities a procedure must possess in order to render a 
judgment that is normatively binding on the parties, that is, that gives them 
an obligation to comply (even if they disagree).95  But in the world of 
Medicare appeals—or indeed any sort of entitlement appeal—compliance 
with the ultimate “judgment” is a given.  When an appeal is granted, the 
government has not “lost,” it has merely changed its position about the 
claimant’s entitlement, and we can expect government agents to act in 
accordance with that position by virtue of their duty to follow the law.  And 
while a claimant can “lose” an entitlement appeal, there is no need to ensure 
the claimant’s compliance in such a case.  The claimant need do—and can 
do—nothing at that point to ensure compliance.  Of course, the claimant 
may be dissatisfied, angry, or take action against the government, but 
Solum’s is a theory of the procedures that produce normative obligation, 
not the procedures that produce compliance in the real world.96  
Second, Solum views his normative legitimacy theory as a supplement 
to, not a replacement for, psychological accounts of the inherent value of 
process.97  Therefore, even in Solum’s view, the inherent value of process 
in a case can vary from appeal to appeal as discussed above, but all the 
variation happens on the psychological dimension, not on the “normative 
legitimacy” dimension. 
 
*     *     * 
 
In sum, the inherent value of participation varies from claimant to 
claimant in ways that are marked among Medicare claimants.  Specifically, 
the following factors are relevant for predicting the inherent value of 
participation:  (1) whether a claim is brought directly by a provider (such as 
a hospital or a durable medical equipment manufacturer) on assignment or 
 
 93. See id. at 238 (“A conception of procedural justice specifies the conditions under 
which the application of the norms of corrective justice to particular cases is fair.”). 
 94. Id. at 241 (“Our investigation will focus on the civil action at the trial level.”). 
 95. Id. at 274 (“How can we regard ourselves as obligated by legitimate authority to 
comply with a judgment that we believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the 
substantive merits?”). 
 96. Id. (“Satisfaction that is merely subjective cannot confer normative legitimacy—
although it may provide the legitimacy that is required for the important social goods of 
voluntary compliance and social stability.”). 
 97. Id. at 273–74 (“[S]atisfaction with the process is not the whole story about 
procedural fairness.” (emphasis added)).  “[L]itigants may feel more satisfied by 
adjudication that affords them the opportunity to tell their story in a meaningful way.” Id.  
“But the focus of this part of the Article is not on accuracy or satisfaction.” Id. 
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by a beneficiary (eighty-five percent of appeals are provider-initiated);98 (2) 
whether the claimant is a corporate entity; and (3) whether the claimant is a 
serial filer in the appeals process or a first-time filer. 
III.  PROCESS SCARCITY 
Where the inherent value of process varies among claimants, as in 
Medicare, it is not theoretically desirable to ration process among claimants 
unless an additional boundary condition is met:  participatory protections 
must be scarce, meaning that there are insufficient resources to provide 
every claimant with the full measure of procedural justice.99  Scarcity is a 
pragmatic, normative boundary condition to procedural triage, as explained 
in Part III.A, and this condition is satisfied in Medicare, as explained in Part 
III.B. 
A.  Process Scarcity As a Boundary Condition 
for Procedural Triage 
Without scarcity, rationing process among claimants would run afoul of 
our background commitment to procedural justice.  This is because absent 
perfect information, any means of tailoring the distribution of procedural 
protections among claimants would inevitably mean denying a hearing to 
some claimants who might have derived enough inherent value from the 
hearing to be worthwhile.  Even if we know enough to say that a hearing 
has no inherent value for some claimants, we are unlikely to find an error-
proof way to deny procedural protections only to those claimants.100 
In the absence of scarcity, the fact that any method of rationing process 
will mean denying a hearing to some for whom it would be worthwhile 
would serve as the basis for a potentially fatal normative objection.  Those 
who are passionate about procedure could object to any such rationing 
mechanism on the grounds that it violates our background commitment to 
procedural justice.  Supporters of rationing could point only to any 
monetary savings generated, triggering the long running debate about 
whether and when adjudicatory processes should sacrifice procedural 
justice for efficiency. 
Process scarcity changes this debate.  In the presence of scarcity, 
rationing process is inevitable.  The question becomes not whether to 
sacrifice participation, but how best to do so, making procedural triage a 
potentially desirable option.  When process is scarce and its value varies, 
we can sacrifice the participation of some not for efficiency, but rather for 
enhanced overall participation. 
 
 98. 2012 OIG REPORT, supra note 19, at 8 (reporting that in FY 2010, beneficiary 
appeals were 11 percent of total volume and 3 percent were state Medicaid agency appeals). 
 99. “Full measure of procedural justice” here means all those procedures that are worth 
the cost, incorporating the inherent value of participation. 
 100. See infra Part IV.C.1–2 (informational problems and market failures make error 
inevitable). 
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To be sure, there are those who are skeptical that participation has 
inherent value that should be given heightened importance in designing 
adjudicatory procedures.101  Such skeptics may object to treating process 
scarcity as a boundary condition for rationing process.  Furthermore, there 
may be circumstances in which the efficiency gains that come from treating 
claimants differently are so extreme as to make procedural triage obviously 
permissible even in the absence of scarcity. 
Whatever one thinks of the inherent value of process, however, any 
triage-based solution to Medicare’s backlog problem would be unlikely to 
get very far in the absence of process scarcity.  There is a consensus among 
scholars of healthcare rationing that an individual appeal is a necessary 
component of any rationing program.102  Similarly, among scholars of 
adjudicatory design, there may not be a consensus, but there is at least a 
chorus of believers in the paramount value of participation.103  And finally, 
belief in the inherent value of participation is reflected in the political 
dialogue about Medicare’s procedures.104 
This emphasis on the inherent value of participation in designing 
Medicare’s coverage appeals process is appropriate.  The inherent value of 
participation can be difficult to measure precisely, though scholars in 
psychology have tried with some success to measure the psychological 
 
 101. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 228 n.6; Solum, supra note 18, at 265 n.213 
(collecting sources). 
 102. See generally NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY:  CAN 
WE LEARN TO SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2002) (stating that insurers, whether public or 
private, should offer a right to appeal adverse coverage decisions); TIMOTHY JOST, HEALTH 
CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS:  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (2004); Mark 
A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1637, 1680–81 (1992) (making the case that independent reviewers should be 
empowered to reconsider coverage decisions on a case-by-case basis, but arguing against 
relying on courts to perform this function). 
 103. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 6, at 259–60; Miller, supra note 15, at 60–61; Martin 
H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process and the Day-in-
Court Ideal:  Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemmas, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1877, 1880 (2000) (value of participation is “extremely high but not absolute”); Saphire, 
supra note 6, at 122–23; Solum, supra note 18, at 320–21; Robert S. Summers, Evaluating 
and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 
(1974); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 258, 279–80 (1978) (process values have become “consensus values” acknowledged by 
“the scholarly community and acknowledged by Congress”). 
 104. When in the 1980s the procedures were made to deny an ALJ hearing for fee-for-
service appeals arising in Medicare Part B (governing outpatient care), the resulting outcry 
led to the right to a hearing now embedded in the statutory text. H.R. REP. NO. 99-727, at 95 
(1986) (discussing fairness as reason for change); Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Beneficiary 
Appeals Process, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 70 
(2002) (discussing change).  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services—the agency 
responsible for administering Medicare—itself has listed generation of acceptance of adverse 
coverage decisions as a primary purpose of adjudicatory procedures to review healthcare 
coverage decisions. See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,341 (July 23, 2010) 
(“[A] full[] and fair[] system of claims and appeals processing [can] facilitate enrollee 
acceptance of cost management efforts.”). 
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benefit of “fair” process.105  But the difficulty of measuring the inherent 
value of participation should not be taken as a reflection of its 
importance.106 
The potential of participating in an adjudicatory process to promote 
acceptance is especially important when it comes to decisions about 
healthcare coverage.107  Beneficiaries’ willingness to make use of a public 
entitlement program like Medicare may depend in part on the trust that they 
put in the operation of the program.108  Furthermore, managed care failed in 
part because its efforts to cut back on healthcare expenses, which sounded 
promising in theory, were subject to public outcries by disappointed 
claimants.  Cases of this basic type persist to this day; it has become a 
familiar tune.109 
If we hope not only to get coverage decisions right but also to get them 
accepted by the people that matter—disappointed claimants—we must use 
every tool at our disposal, and participatory process is an especially 
promising one.  Indeed, the need for such tools to make healthcare rationing 
decisions more palatable will only increase as healthcare costs rise as 
compared to gross domestic product.110  So our hesitation to curb 
procedural protections solely in the name of efficiency should be especially 
pronounced in healthcare. 
Finally, an independent objection to procedural triage—inequality—also 
is vitiated in the presence of process scarcity.  A surging view in 
scholarship on procedural design sometimes sees equality as an under-
appreciated administrative consideration that should be considered on par 
with procedural justice and efficiency.111  This view finds support in 
 
 105. See generally Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 66 (providing a overview of empirical 
work); Solum, supra note 18, at 213 (collecting several dozen sources from “procedural 
justice” literature). But see Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1211, 1212 (1988); KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 212 n.613 (offering alternative 
explanations for observed results). 
 106. It is difficult enough to measure the effect of legal rules on more easily measurable 
outputs, like mortality or gun violence.  To measure the effect of a legal process (not just a 
rule) on a psychological or normative output, like acceptance or dignity, is even more 
difficult. 
 107. See generally Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law:  A 
Structural Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978) (advocating greater use of participatory 
structures in healthcare decision making). 
 108. See Marianne Bertrand et al., A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty, 94 AM. 
ECON. REV. 419, 422 (2004). 
 109. Leada Gore, Morbidly Obese Girl with Rare Condition Will Receive Gastric Bypass 
Surgery After Tricare Reverses Earlier Denial, AL.COM (Mar. 20, 2014, 8:58 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/wire/2014/03/morbidly_obese_girl_with_rare.html [http://perma.cc/YZJ3-
QRKC]. 
 110. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS:  THE LAW, ETHICS, AND 
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 3–5 (1997) (stating that “medical advances” will 
not “eventually reduce medical spending by making people fundamentally healthier” 
because “[m]edical needs are inherently limitless”). 
 111. E.g., Lahav, supra note 15, at 435 (discussing possibility of justifying sampling by 
“favoring equality over liberty”); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 
484 (1986) (discussing equality as process value); Robinson & Abraham, supra note 6, at 
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Mashaw’s and Solum’s theories of procedural justice, which also list 
equality as an important procedural value.112 
Procedural triage in the face of claimant variation and process scarcity 
would not violate this equality concern, because any differential treatment 
would be neither arbitrary nor based in animus.  It would be a deliberate 
response to differences among claimants, designed to improve the welfare 
of claimants overall.  As such, even a mandatory approach to procedural 
triage would not raise constitutional equality concerns and also would be 
permissible under Solum’s view of procedural justice.113  Any approach to 
procedural triage that incorporated claimant consent, as does this Article’s 
ultimate proposal, would avoid equality concerns for that reason, as well. 
B.  Process Scarcity in Medicare 
Procedural triage is theoretically desirable in Medicare because process is 
indeed scarce.  To be sure, the backlog of Medicare claims does not alone 
show that there are not enough resources to give every claimant a prompt 
hearing, because the process might be designed poorly.  If alternative 
design changes could remove Medicare’s hearing backlog without 
sacrificing procedural protections, then rationing process could not be 
defended as unavoidable.  However, no such alternative fix is on the 
horizon. 
First, an obvious way to alleviate the backlog would be to increase the 
budget for hearings enough to meet current demand.  But Congress is 
unlikely to appropriate the funds necessary to “fix” the budgetary 
problem.114  This is due not only to the difficult budgetary environment, but 
also to the fact that ALJs have life tenure, making it very difficult and 
especially costly to ramp up ALJ capacity quickly or on a temporary 
basis.115 
Second, the problem in Medicare’s coverage appeals process also could 
be understood as one of the volume of would-be claimants; if there were 
 
1503 (“A system designed so that all claimants cannot enjoy the same due process 
‘right’ . . . arguably denies the latter the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 112. Solum, supra note 18, at 277–78. 
 113. See id. at 287–88 (“If others are afforded a right of participation, but I am arbitrarily 
denied this right, I have been treated unequally and have a right to complain . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114. In 2013, more than four appeals were filed for every one appeal resolved. See 
OMHA PowerPoint, supra note 8, at 16.  A four-fold increase in the budget to resolve 
appeals would require an appropriation of $348,044,000. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., FY 2016 BUDGET IN BRIEF, http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/budget-in-brief/omha/ 
(reporting that OMHA budget in FY 2015 was $87,011,000) [http://perma.cc/4RB3-5S6D].  
Congress is aware of the backlog, but its latest effort is a draft bill that would require the 
agency to produce a report within 180 days, proposing steps to alleviate the backlog. See 
COUNCIL FOR MEDICARE INTEGRITY, INSIDE CMS:  SENATORS USE HHS APPROPS BILL TO 
PUSH MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM FIX (2014), http://medicareintegrity.org/inside-cms-
senators-use-hhs-approps-bill-to-push-medicare-appeals-system-fix/ [http://perma.cc/483V-
48NQ]. 
 115. By statute and regulation, ALJ examination and hiring is managed by the Office of 
Personnel Management. 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2015). 
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fewer appeals, there would be no backlog.  But a volume-based solution is 
also unlikely to work.  We could reduce the volume of claimants by 
reducing the scrutiny Medicare applies to coverage claims—and so the 
number of denials—as the American Hospital Association has urged.116  
But such a solution would trade a volume problem for an overtreatment 
(and overpayment) problem.117  Similarly, while some contractors have 
argued that the volume of appeals could be reduced by increasing the 
predictability of ALJ decisions,118 Medicare already seeks to make 
coverage predictable insofar as it is able to through its “National Coverage 
Determination” process.119  Like the social security disability cases that 
Mashaw studied,120 the disputes that populate the backlog surround 
irreducibly uncertain questions of professional judgment121 as to which 
“medicine is more art than science.”122  Therefore, a volume-based solution 
is unlikely, as well.123 
Neither a budget- nor volume-based solution is likely to work, so the 
scarcity condition is met.  Medicare must confront, for the time being, the 
 
 116. See Letter from Am. Hospital Ass’n to Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r of the Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/ 
2014/140114-let-aljdelays.pdf [http://perma.cc/6UE2-36XC]. 
 117. Medicare needs to scrutinize claims for coverage if it is to control costs and ensure 
that beneficiaries are not needlessly subjected to unnecessary or frivolous treatments.  That is 
why the Affordable Care Act instructed Medicare to continue to scrutinize claims closely 
and ordered this scrutiny be expanded to Medicaid. Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6411, 124 Stat. 119, 773–75 (2010). 
 118. See Press Release, Health Data Mgm’t, Medicare Recovery Audit Contractors Ask 
Congress for Changes (Jan 15, 2014), http://properpayments.org/medicare-recovery-audit-
contractors-ask-congress-for-changes/ [http://perma.cc/H724-G2HM]. 
 119. See generally JOST, supra note 102 (discussing National Coverage Determination 
process); KINNEY, supra note 104, at 5, 18–20; ELEANOR D. KINNEY, GUIDE TO MEDICARE 
COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS (2002); RICHARD A. RETTIG, HEALTH CARE IN 
TRANSITION (1997). 
 120. See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 457 (4th ed. 1998) (“[T]he fact-
based, highly contextual decision making involved in the [social security] disability program 
simply cannot be structured through precedent.  Variation among ALJs is something like the 
variance that one would expect from one-person juries applying the ‘reasonable person’ 
standard.”). 
 121. These might be “legal” questions about medical science where rulemaking is not 
possible, or “factual” questions entailing application of established coverage standards to the 
facts of a particular patient’s case in light of judgments about the severity of symptoms, 
characterization of past history, and so on. See David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician 
Practice:  The Role of Uncertainty, 3 HEALTH AFF. 74, 75 (1984) (“Uncertainty creeps into 
medical practice through every pore.  Whether a physician is defining a disease, making a 
diagnosis, selecting a procedure, observing outcomes, assessing probabilities, assigning 
preferences, or putting it all together, he is walking on very slippery terrain.  It is difficult for 
nonphysicians, and for many physicians, to appreciate how complex these tasks are, how 
poorly we understand them, and how easy it is for honest people to come to differen[t] 
conclusions.”). 
 122. See HALL, supra note 26, at 84; see also ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN:  THE 
PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 4 (2002). 
 123. A third volume-based solution is Phyllis Bernard’s proposal to have doctor and 
patient work together on a mediated treatment plan prior to service. See generally Phyllis E. 
Bernard, Mediating with an 800-Pound Gorilla:  Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1417, 1449 (2003).  Absent a significant upfront investment and alteration to the 
Medicare program of the sort Bernard recommends, that solution is not feasible. 
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condition of “process scarcity”124 which has afflicted many other 
administrative processes at various times, from Veterans’ Benefits to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Because the inherent value of 
procedural protections also varies from claimant to claimant, Medicare 
could theoretically make the most of its present condition of process 
scarcity by engaging in procedural triage, rationing procedural protections 
among claimants based on need. 
IV.  OPERATIONALIZING PROCEDURAL TRIAGE:  
A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 
Procedural protections are scarce in Medicare, and their inherent value 
varies from claimant to claimant.  So Medicare could theoretically improve 
welfare by rationing process among claimants, providing the claimants who 
benefit most from participation with more and those who benefit least with 
less, if a way can be found to do so that creates more net benefits than costs. 
That is a big “if.”  Distributing procedural protections on the basis of the 
inherent value of participation for particular claimants is easier said than 
done, which has caused the few scholars who have recognized the 
theoretical possibility of variation to nonetheless assume claimant 
homogeneity.125  That choice is understandable. 
As elaborated in this part, a number of special features of the product that 
is participatory process make it especially difficult to ration among 
claimants in practice.  These include:  the relationship between accuracy 
and participation; the difficulty of measuring the inherent value of 
participation to a particular claimant; the abstract nature of the inherent 
value of participation; and the information asymmetry between claimants 
and adjudicatory designers. 
This part works through these obstacles—with the help of behavioral 
economics—to identify how Medicare could nonetheless harness the 
variation in its claimant population to add value by engaging in procedural 
triage.  It begins by identifying, in Part IV.A, five considerations that affect 
the costs and benefits of any rationing mechanism:  effect on accuracy, 
participation value, effect on primary behavior, transaction cost, and 
legality. 
Because the first of these considerations (effect on accuracy) is a primary 
consideration in adjudicatory design, Part IV.B suggests a way for 
Medicare to engage in procedural triage without undermining accuracy by 
splitting its administrative process into two tracks:  one optimized for 
accuracy and the other for participation.  Part IV.C then applies the 
remaining considerations to evaluate libertarian, paternalistic, and 
behavioral approaches to sifting claimants between these two tracks.  It 
concludes by recommending that Medicare should ration process among 
claimants using a behavioral approach. 
 
 124. The term “process scarcity” was brought into legal scholarship by Robert Bone. See 
generally Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 6. 
 125. See generally supra note 7. 
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A.  Considerations 
Effect on accuracy:  A primary consideration for any method of rationing 
process is the associated effect, if any, on the accuracy of the adjudicatory 
system.126  Indeed, in the view of some, the entire purpose of the 
adjudicatory process is to encourage accurate administration.127 
Accuracy is threatened by many methods of rationing process because 
accuracy and participation are often tied together.128  Participatory 
procedural protections promote not just participation, but also accuracy, 
even where they do not do so as cost effectively or as well as alternative 
administrative tools.  So a system that gives some claimants less procedural 
protection than others risks rationing not just process but also accuracy as to 
those claimants’ claims, and this possibility must be accounted for in 
weighing the desirability of particular approaches to rationing process. 
Participation value:  The goal of procedural triage is to increase a second 
output of the administrative process, namely, the inherent value of 
participation derived from a particular distribution of procedural 
entitlements to claimants.  This Article calls this “participation value,” but it 
also can be thought of as “procedural utility,”129 “process value,”130 
“process significance,”131 or even as a version of Michelman’s 
“demoralization cost.”132  Indeed, as will be shown in Part IV.B, the 
participation value of Medicare hearings is what makes them worthwhile 
despite the existence of other more streamlined alternatives.  The reason 
that triage may be worthwhile is that this value varies from Medicare 
claimant to Medicare claimant as discussed above in Part II.  This 
combination creates room to generate greater overall participation value 
 
 126. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication:  An Economic Analysis, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307–08 (1994) (“One might go so far as to say that a large portion of 
the rules of civil, criminal, and administrative procedure and rules of evidence involve an 
effort to strike a balance between accuracy and legal costs.”); Robert S. Summers, 
Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 17–18 (1974) (proposing that accuracy come first in designing legal process that 
takes into account inherent value of participation). 
 127. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules:  The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008) (discussing this vision of procedure); Roscoe Pound, Some 
Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 491, 508 (1909) (“[T]he court should 
have full power to make whatever order the whole case and complete justice in accord with 
substantive law may require.”). 
 128. To be specific, “accuracy” here means “the correspondence of the substantive 
outcome of an adjudication with the true facts of the claimant’s situation and with an 
appropriate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts.” CHARLES H. KOCH ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES & MATERIALS (quoting Jerry Mashaw, The Management Side 
of Due Process:  Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, 
Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 
772, 774 (1974)). 
 129. Bruno S. Frey et al., Introducing Procedural Utility:  Not Only What, but Also How 
Matters, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 377, 377 (2004). 
 130. Summers, supra note 126, at 4. 
 131. Amartya Sen, Maximization and the Act of Choice, 65 ECONOMETRICA 745, 745 
(1997). 
 132. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967). 
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through a more careful distribution of the system’s scarce procedural 
resources. 
Effect on primary behavior:  Third, certain mechanisms for rationing 
process could affect the primary behavior of claimants, who may behave in 
the shadow of the rules of procedure.133  For example, Part II noted that 
first-time filers tend to derive greater inherent value from participation than 
repeat players.  A rule simply denying hearings to serial filers, however, 
could distort some providers’ decisions of whether to accept assignment, a 
result that could pose its own benefits or costs. 
Transaction cost:  Fourth, we must take into account the added 
administrative cost, if any, associated with a given method of rationing 
process. 
Legality:  In addition to these costs and benefits, Medicare faces both 
constitutional and legal constraints on the design of its administrative 
processes.  The Due Process Clause applies to Medicare coverage decisions, 
and the Medicare statute specifies particular procedures that the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services (“the Secretary”) should follow.134  While 
these legal considerations do not affect the cost or benefit of any particular 
rationing proposal, they act as constraints that must be kept in mind in 
weighing the feasibility of potential means of rationing process. 
B.  A Two-Track Process Would Avoid Accuracy Costs 
Because promoting accurate administration is a primary value in 
designing any adjudicatory process, any method of procedural triage that 
leads to suboptimal accuracy may well be cost prohibitive.  Specifically, 
simply denying some claimants the ability to appeal adverse coverage 
decisions altogether would deny those claimants both participation and a 
means of quality control in Medicare.  While a wheelchair manufacturer 
denied a right to a hearing altogether might be no worse off from a 
procedural justice perspective, unless there is some alternative means for 
ensuring the quality of decision making on the manufacturer’s claims, the 
manufacturer (and its customers) may then be subjected to a higher net 
denial rate as a result.  Such an adverse effect on the accuracy of the 
administrative process could well outweigh whatever benefits otherwise 
result from procedural triage. 
Medicare could ration participatory protections among claimants without 
creating this problem by splitting its adjudicatory process into two tracks:  
one focused on cost-effective but accurate resolution of claims by any 
means necessary and the other constrained to provide participatory 
procedural protections.  The result would be a split adjudicatory process 
analogous to the federal courts prior to the merger of law and equity.135  
 
 133. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 134. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 135. The two-track process proposed here would be analogous to the law-equity divide 
insofar as it would offer two distinct adjudicatory processes for resolution of the same sorts 
of substantive claims; insofar as one such process would be tailored toward fairness, the 
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Here, however, one track would be optimized for efficiency (rather than 
tailored to remedies at law) and the other for participation (rather than 
tailored to equitable remedies).  In Mashaw’s terms, the efficiency track 
would reflect the “bureaucratic rationality” model of administrative process, 
and the participation track would reflect the “moral judgment” model.136 
Such a two-track approach could lower administrative costs in the 
efficiency track without creating accuracy costs because participation is not 
the most cost-effective way to ensure accuracy in Medicare’s administrative 
process.  Procedure scholars will not be surprised at this conclusion, 
because participation and accuracy are often in tension.137  More 
streamlined methods have been used to promote accuracy more cost-
effectively in resolving claims in many areas of the law.  For example, 
Medicare’s approach to monitoring its administrative contractors’ 
reopening decisions does not include adjudication at all.138  Similarly, mass 
disaster relief programs such as the Gulf Coast Claims Fund have used their 
own streamlined processes to distribute funds without providing a 
participatory hearing to every claimant.139  Inquisitorial systems can be 
used to achieve accuracy more cost effectively while affording claimants 
diminished opportunities for participation.140 
Just so in Medicare, where more streamlined administrative technologies 
could resolve claims as accurately, or nearly as accurately, as live hearings 
and would come at a fraction of the cost.  For one, statistical sampling 
techniques (what Robert Bone calls “actuarial litigation”)141 could be used 
 
other would be toward efficiency.  There are ways, however, in which the analogy breaks 
down.  Most importantly, while “law” procedures and “equity” procedures governed the 
same sorts of substantive claims, different remedies were available through each set of 
procedures. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (abolishing division between equity procedure and law 
procedure, except for certain limited exceptions); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and 
Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (“Equity moderates the rigid 
and uniform application of law by incorporating standards of fairness and morality into the 
judicial process.”); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation:  Lessons 
from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58 (2004) 
(“[E]quity . . . offer[ed] a form of ‘individualized justice’ unavailable in the official legal 
system.”). 
 136. See Mashaw, supra note 83, at 184–90. 
 137. See infra Part V.B. 
 138. See Palomar Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 693 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 139. E.g., BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012), http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/other/ 
BDO%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/RNE8-NQCN]. 
 140. See OMHA, Statements of C.F. Moore, Deputy Chief Admin. Law Judge, and  
Robert Fisher, Admin. Law Judge (Feb. 12, 2014) (notes on file with author); see also Mark 
Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837 (2011) 
(“[V]isually observing witnesses at best contributes nothing to a credibility determination 
and at worst increases the likelihood that a fact-finder will get it wrong.”); Allan A. 
Toubman et al., Due Process Implications of Telephone Hearings:  The Case for an 
Individualized Approach to Scheduling Telephone Hearings, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 407, 
416 n.31 (1995) (listing sources doubting usefulness of in-person credibility determinations). 
 141. On statistical sampling generally, see Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. 
Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2061 (2012) (“Sampling 
uses a subset of individuals from within a population to yield some knowledge about the 
whole population.  Sampling lowers costs, speeds data collection, and, because the sample 
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in order to determine the error rate for groups of appealed claims—say, 
knee brace claims in a given geographic region—with reimbursement in the 
run of claims based on the rate of success for analogous claims in the 
sample.  Just as sampling and bellwether trials are used to resolve thousands 
of claims in federal court and alternative dispute resolution,142 such a 
method has the potential to create substantially the same aggregate 
accuracy, and accompanying incentive effects on utilization reviewers, as 
individual treatment for a fraction of the cost.  Indeed, Medicare has 
recently begun a pilot project to experiment with limited statistical 
sampling on a subset of coverage appeals.143 
Even for those cases not amenable to “actuarial litigation,” individual 
adjudication could be streamlined significantly.  In lieu of live hearings, the 
efficiency track could employ the paper hearing process that the Affordable 
Care Act sets up to resolve analogous healthcare coverage disputes in the 
private sector.144  Rather than presenting evidence and testimony in a live 
hearing before an ALJ, claimants would have their appeals decided solely 
on the basis of written filings by board-certified clinicians.145  This process 
costs the private insurance companies required to use it about half as much 
as the live hearings currently used in Medicare,146 but does not appreciably 
diminish accuracy.147 
 
surveyed is smaller, ensures higher quality and more consistency in the information 
gathered.”); Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 227 (2011); Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 6; Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law 
and Large Numbers:  Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 
435 (2007); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545, 
567 (1998). 
 142. E.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), 
vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether 
Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 582–85 (2008). 
 143. See Griswold Statement, supra note 51. 
 144. For a description of the private-sector coverage appeals process, see Roy F. Harmon, 
An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review Process—ERISA Claimants Get “Some 
Kind of a Hearing”, 56 S.D. L. REV. 408, 433 (2011). See generally Katherine T. Vukadin, 
Hope or Hype:  Why the Affordable Care Act’s New External Review Rules for Denied 
ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 BUFF. REV. 1201 (2012). 
 145. See Vukadin, supra note 144, at 1211. 
 146. A paper hearing costs on average $470–$690 to conduct. NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF 
INS., HEALTHCARE REVIEW PROGRAM:  2008 ANNUAL REPORT 19, http://www.ncdoi.com/ 
smart/Documents/ExternalReviewReport11.pdf [http://perma.cc/QQ28-V324].  The average 
live hearing costs Medicare $1170. Compare DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 4, https://www.cms.gov/ 
About-CMS/Agency-Information/PerformanceBudget/Downloads/FY2014-CJ-Final.pdf 
(reporting that OMHA budget in FY 2012 was $72,011,000) [http://perma.cc/D6XA-BPUS], 
with OMHA PowerPoint, supra note 8 (noting that 61,517 were resolved in FY 2012). 
 147. ALJs in the Medicare process have expressed skepticism about the accuracy benefit 
of a live hearing.  That skepticism is consistent with the fact that decisions are based on the 
record of doctors’ notes and medical literature.  Furthermore, the paper hearings used in the 
private sector rely on independent clinical experts with subject-matter expertise rather than 
ALJs.  So it is not obvious which is better positioned to come to the “right” answer about the 
question of professional judgment at issue in most Medicare coverage disputes, i.e., the 
“medical necessity” of the underlying treatment or service.  Once Medicare began operating 
the efficiency track, it could assess specifically the accuracy benefit, if any, by assigning a 
group of efficiency track appeals at random to the participation track. 
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That said, there would be opportunities to streamline the efficiency track 
above and beyond the reforms mentioned above.  Indeed, the efficiency 
“track” might actually be multiple tracks.  This is because when free to 
focus only on efficiency, it may be possible to particularize procedures 
within this track to the unique demands of particular claims.148  Indeed, 
policymakers need not craft this plethora of process products;149 they could 
engage claimants in crafting procedural settlements that propose novel 
means of resolving groups of claims, as is sometimes done in mass tort 
litigation.150 
An efficiency track could use such reforms to provide the same level of 
aggregate accuracy as the “participation” track, or at least to provide a 
diminished level of aggregate accuracy that comes at sufficient savings to 
be worth the tradeoff.  In either case, claims on the efficiency track could be 
resolved at a fraction of the cost of claims on the participation track without 
creating an accuracy cost. 
C.  A Behavioral Approach Would Maximize Participation Benefits 
As participation is not the most cost-effective way to promote accuracy 
in Medicare—because hearings are in this sense inefficient—a two-track 
process would allow Medicare to triage claimants without sacrificing the 
accurate administration of claims.  But is there a workable means to sort 
claimants between the “efficiency” track and the “participation” track? 
The developing literature on normative behavioral economics provides a 
starting point for evaluating this question, distinguishing between three 
sorts of regulatory approaches:  (1) choice-based, libertarian regulatory 
approaches; (2) mandatory, paternalistic regulatory approaches; and (3) 
hybrid, behavioral regulatory approaches.  This section proposes 
mechanisms for rationing process among Medicare claimants using each 
sort of approach, evaluates these proposals using the considerations listed in 
 
 148. For example, one set of rules might apply to inpatient hospital admission appeals and 
another to wheelchair appeals to the extent that the two present different sorts of evidentiary 
issues. Cf. Frank Sander, Address Before the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice:  Varieties of Dispute Processing (Apr. 7–
9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) (conceptualizing civil courts as dispute resolution processes 
and arguing that alternative processes could better resolve disputes).  This sort of tailoring is 
impossible in a process designed to be accommodating to pro se or unsophisticated 
claimants, who may not be able to correctly identify the nature of their substantive claim at 
the outset of a proceeding and thereby shift it onto the right track.  That was the reason for 
the abandonment of particular forms of action in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1041 (3d ed. 2004). 
 149. Policymakers should, however, offer a default set of procedures.  This would carry 
several benefits, including (1) lower transaction costs, resulting from saving claimants the 
transaction cost of devising their own procedures, (2) lower adjudication costs, resulting 
from the fact that claimants (and counsel) need become familiar with only one (or a few) sets 
of procedures, and (3) network effects, resulting from the fact that through repetition and 
experience, bugs in a particular process can be worked out. 
 150. Lahav, supra note 15, at 416–17 (discussing settlement in Diet Drugs litigation, In re 
Diet Drugs III, 226 F.R.D. 498, 514 (E.D. Pa. 2005), that created “two-tiered appeal system” 
for resolving claims). 
110 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Part IV.A, and ultimately compares all three to a one-size-fits-all approach 
to rationing process. 
As we will see, the operational difficulty of sorting claimants between 
tracks presents a final obstacle to procedural triage.  But it is nonetheless 
possible to conclude that Medicare should indeed ration process among 
claimants based on need and that a behavioral approach is the safest way for 
it to do so.151 
1.  Libertarian Approach 
The presumptively superior way to sort Medicare claimants would be to 
allow them to make their own choices about whether the benefit of 
participation is worth its costs.  For example, we might charge claimants 
wishing to utilize the participation track rather than the efficiency track a 
heightened filing fee, equal to the cost of a hearing less any subsidy.152  To 
mitigate inertia we could use active choosing, forcing claimants to decide 
whether to pursue the participation track (at some cost) or the efficiency 
track at the time of filing.153  And we could even tailor the subsidy to the 
claimant, based on our assessment of their likely capacity to benefit from 
procedural protections—beneficiaries might be subject to a lower filing fee 
than providers, individuals a lower fee than corporate entities, and so on.  
The presumptive superiority of such an approach comes in part from 
claimants’ specialized information about themselves and their claims, and 
in part from the normative preference for choice.154 
Effect on accuracy:  The only added concern for accuracy posed by a 
choice-based approach to triage is the possibility of adverse selection.  The 
desire to obtain reversal would lead claimants to make use of whichever 
procedural track they perceived to give them the best odds in a particular 
case, perhaps directing cases more likely to bias the adjudicator into the 
participation track.  This threat could be avoided by requiring claimants to 
 
 151. This section concludes that the behavioral approach is the “safest” rather than the 
“best” way to ration process in Medicare.  That is because the goal of this section is to 
demonstrate that there is a means by which Medicare could improve on the status quo (long 
delayed live hearings for all claimants) by triaging claimants.  As a result, the analysis treats 
three conditions as constraints:  (1) the intervention must not more-than-marginally diminish 
accuracy, see supra Part IV.B; (2) the intervention must not decrease the overall 
participation value produced by the adjudicatory process, see infra Part IV.C.4; and (3) the 
intervention must not more-than-marginally alter primary behavior, specifically, providers’ 
and suppliers’ decisions whether to take assignment of claims from beneficiaries, see infra 
Part IV.C.3.  However, note that this conservative approach is not inevitable; a procedural 
justice skeptic might be comfortable putting a price on participation and so support a system 
that diminished participation overall while capturing substantial savings.  So too, a more 
aggressive analysis could assign values to accuracy and primary behavior effects in 
identifying an optimal sorting regime. 
 152. Rosenberg proposes an approach like this for resolution of mass torts. Rosenberg, 
supra note 7, at 256 n.110. 
 153. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39–43 (2013) 
(discussing arguments in favor of active choosing). 
 154. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 507, 527 (2011) (discussing presumptive superiority of market-based allocation of 
procedural entitlements). 
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choose between the participation route and the efficiency route as to all 
their claims in a given year. 
Participation value:  Unfortunately, the product that is process to dispute 
Medicare coverage decisions is subject to two market failures that would 
tend to distort the demand for participatory process downward, leading 
claimants to “purchase” too little, even if we subsidize the cost.155  These 
possibilities undermine the presumptive efficiency of a market-based 
approach.156 
First, on the classical side, it can be difficult to inform claimants about 
the nature and value of procedural protections.157  Uninformed claimants 
may tend to focus on one or two salient characteristics—such as time to 
decision or cost of appealing—as beneficiaries do when shopping for 
insurance.  Second, on the behavioral side, the inherent value of 
participation depends to some extent on the potential for being heard, which 
could soothe a negative emotional reaction to a decision denying coverage.  
But claimants may fail to anticipate that being heard could have this 
grievance-soothing effect, due to the tendency to assume static preferences 
known in behavioral economics as “projection bias.”158  This possibility is 
especially pronounced when dealing with patients.159 
That said, the simple possibility of error does not mean that triage using a 
market approach would decrease the participation value created by the 
system rather than increase it.  Part IV.C.4 discusses those possibilities and 
offers an approach to calculating the participation value of Medicare’s 
process. 
Effect on primary behavior:  A libertarian approach with a flat filing fee 
and subsidy would have no effect on primary behavior (outside of its 
accuracy effects).  Because a claimant’s entitlement to a hearing would not 
depend on her status or actions, she would have no incentive under such a 
regime to take particular actions or obtain any particular status in order to 
become eligible for a hearing. 
 
 155. Two market failures could be corrected by a subsidy and so are not discussed as 
distortions above:  First, decisions about procedural protections present positive externalities 
because of the societal value of participation. See supra Part II.B–C; Lawrence, supra note 
21.  And second, as Medicare is an entitlement program, many claimants may not be able to 
afford to pay the cost of a hearing.  A special subsidy might be offered for such claimants on 
the basis of wealth, along the lines of in forma pauperis status in federal court. 
 156. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 154, at 513 (“[P]rivate transactions presumptively 
are efficient only if there are no negative externalities.”). 
 157. It can be difficult even to inform a claimant that she has the right to appeal; ensuring 
she is well informed about the potential benefits of particular procedures is even more 
difficult. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 6, at 624 (offering reasons to doubt 
that tort plaintiffs could ever fully be informed in making such a choice). See generally 
Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429 (2011) 
(pointing to shortcomings of disclosure rules). 
 158. See generally Lawrence, supra note 21. 
 159. See Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting:  An Unrecognized 
Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 1708, 1710 (2008); 
George Loewenstein, Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making, 25 MED. DECIS. MAKING 
96, 97–98 (2005). 
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A libertarian approach that varied the filing fee from claimant to claimant 
could, however, disrupt primary behavior.  For example, a heightened filing 
fee for corporate entities could give hospitals an incentive to change their 
practices by, say, rearranging their billing practices so that appeals 
technically would be filed by a doctor rather than the hospital. 
Transaction cost:  Some investment would be required to harmonize 
claimants’ ex ante likelihood of success on each track.  Otherwise, if 
claimants’ odds of success would be better on the participation track, then 
some would avoid it for that reason (and vice versa).  To avoid this 
problem, Medicare could compare samples of appeals from the efficiency 
track and the participation track in order to make sure that the participation 
track was not producing a higher reversal rate.  This might entail randomly 
selecting some efficiency track appeals for processing through the 
participation track, or even processing a sample of claims in both tracks.  If 
the participation track appeals were reversed more often relative to case 
mix, adjudicators could be encouraged to alter their scrutiny of claims (in 
either track) to align success rates.  For example, compensation of 
adjudicators in the efficiency track might be tied to the alignment of their 
decisions with outcomes on the participation track—the decisions of ALJs.  
Regardless, the results of the study could be published, to provide 
reassurance to claimants (and their counsel).160 
Legality:  A libertarian approach would not run contrary to the statutory 
mandate for hearings, because the efficiency track would be an optional 
supplement to the statutory route, not a replacement.  The Medicare statute 
gives the Secretary broad powers to “prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary to carry out the administration” of Medicare, pursuant to which 
she could create the efficiency track for handling coverage appeals.161  
Indeed, she could start by temporarily creating the “efficiency” track as a 
pilot project, without notice-and-comment rulemaking.162  Furthermore, the 
Due Process Clause would not stand in the way because the Supreme Court 
has been sanguine about consensual agreements to forego procedural rights 
made in the course of adjudicating a claim, after a dispute has arisen.163 
 
 160. The fact that a particular appeal is a bellwether—one of the sample cases upon 
which a large group of cases would turn—could be kept secret from the ALJ hearing the case 
to ensure bias does not creep in. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 211 (2010) (discussing unconscious bias in adjudicator decision 
making). 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(1) (2012). 
 162. See generally Kristin Madison, Building a Better Laboratory:  The Federal Role in 
Promoting Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 765, 767–68 (2014) (discussing 
pilot project authority). See also Eleanor D. Kinney & William M. Sage, Resolving Medical 
Malpractice Claims in the Medicare Program:  Can It Be Done?, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 77, 97 
(2005) (discussing pilot project authenticity). 
 163. See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184–86 (1972). See generally 
Lawrence, supra note 21.  Pre-dispute agreements can be more problematic. Lawrence, 
supra note 21. 
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2.  Paternalistic Approach 
Instead of relying on claimants’ choices, Medicare could distribute 
procedural entitlements paternalistically, by mandate.  Medicare could pick 
and choose which claimants deserve a live hearing one-by-one, much as 
judges evaluate whether plaintiffs are constitutionally deserving of access to 
federal court by applying standing criteria case-by-case.164  Or, a blanket 
rule could be used to sort claimants somewhat less accurately without the 
transaction cost of individualized determinations.  For example, hearings 
could be given to beneficiaries but not to providers, or to individuals but not 
corporate entities.165  Mandatory rationing, however, also has limitations. 
Legality:  A first, practical problem is that a mandatory approach to 
rationing process would require a change in the law.  The Medicare 
statute’s promise of healthcare coverage creates a constitutional entitlement, 
so the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment dictates coverage 
cannot be denied without affording, at least, the right to an individualized 
hearing.166  As a result, an administrative process that did not offer 
everyone who has a constitutionally cognizable claim, providers or 
beneficiaries, with at least a paper hearing would be at risk of constitutional 
attack.167  Furthermore, the Medicare statute separately grants providers as 
well as beneficiaries a right to a live hearing, so a statutory change would 
be required to triage claimants paternalistically.168 
Effect on accuracy:  A paternalistic approach to triaging claimants would 
not have an adverse effect on the accuracy of Medicare’s administrative 
process so long as a two-track system is used to unbundle participation and 
accuracy as described in Part IV.B. 
 
 164. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992). 
 165. The possibility of treating providers and beneficiaries differently by fiat has as its 
inspiration OMHA.  Recent practice allows those claimants who self-identify as 
beneficiaries to forward their appeals to a specific address first in line, ahead of provider 
appeals in the backlog. See Griswold Statement, supra note 51, at 4.  While this practice does 
not save resources and therefore does not alleviate the backlog as does the proposal offered 
in this Article, it does involve a form of mandatory sorting.  As discussed above, such an 
approach creates legal and normative issues but may nonetheless be warranted. 
 166. Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeal Procedures:  
Can Process Meet the Challenge of New Medical Technology?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1461, 1485 (2003) (discussing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982)). 
 167. While prior to 2002, constitutional procedures were offered early in the Medicare 
administrative process at the carrier (first) level, see Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195, changes 
enacted in that year left the ALJ hearing the only individualized hearing available through 
the Medicare appeals process.  The constitutional status of providers’ right to a hearing when 
they take assignment of a claim is not as straightforward as that of a beneficiary, but a 
provider would, at first blush, appear to have a plausible argument that due process entitles it 
to a hearing. E.g., Am. Soc’y of Cataract & Refractive Surgery v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 447, 
455 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that physicians have property interest in being reimbursed at the 
rate set out in the fee schedule); Furlong v. Shalala, 156 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that denial of appeal right violated providers’ due process right); see also Coral 
Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 340 F. Supp. 646, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1972) 
(holding that Medicare denied nursing home due process when it withheld payment without 
granting a hearing). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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Participation value:  The most fundamental problem with a mandatory 
approach to rationing process is that it would be difficult to maximize 
participation value because of incomplete information.  Part II identified 
factors that, when present, tend to indicate that participation would be more 
or less valuable for a particular claim.  But these are only tendencies. 
There are surely exceptions to the tendencies among Medicare claimants 
that Part II identified.  Some beneficiaries may genuinely (and correctly) 
believe that participation would hold no inherent value for them.  
Furthermore, some providers may genuinely benefit from a hearing—a 
chance to say their peace.  Imagine a solo practitioner, who has only a few 
claims a year denied, decides to appeal one such denial because she takes it 
as a professional affront. 
As a result of these variations, any mandatory approach to rationing 
procedural protections would inevitably get it wrong some of the time.  This 
would create participation costs that would limit the added participation 
value of rationing, as discussed at greater length in Part IV.C.4. 
Primary behavior:  Finally, a mandatory approach to procedural triage 
could also change claimants’ primary behavior in undesirable ways.  A 
mandatory approach would hinge entitlement to a hearing purely on a 
claimant’s status or actions.  So a provider or beneficiary who thought 
hearings to be advantageous could position itself ex ante so that its claims 
would come packaged in whatever form would lead to a hearing.  
Specifically, some providers might refuse to accept assignment of claims 
from beneficiaries in order to ensure that denied claims would formally be 
appealed by the beneficiary rather than the provider.  Assignment serves 
multiple beneficial purposes—it insulates beneficiaries from the financial 
cost and distress associated with a denial and puts the responsibility for 
deciding whether to appeal in the hands of the entity best positioned to do 
so—that this result would undermine. 
Transaction cost:  The transaction cost of a mandatory approach would 
depend on the nature of the approach.  A rule-based approach, such as 
treating providers differently per se, would come without any transaction 
cost.  Such an approach, however, would come with a higher error rate.  A 
more standard-based approach to sorting could be used to minimize these 
errors, but that could come with potentially prohibitive transaction costs. 
3.  Behavioral Approach 
A hybrid approach could employ behavioral economics tools to capture 
the major advantage of a market-based approach (the ability of choice to 
avoid legal and normative objections to paternalistic rationing) while 
counteracting its main weakness (market distortions that would cause 
claimants to contract for too little process).  This section discusses the 
behavioral approach in two steps, first proposing how Medicare might use a 
bundle of behavioral economics tools to sort claimants between tracks and 
then evaluating this behavioral approach. 
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a.  Behavioral Approach Explained 
Claimants could be given a choice whether to pursue a live hearing or 
instead pursue faster resolution through the efficiency track, thereby 
avoiding the primary objections to a purely paternalistic mandatory 
approach.  But because market failures make claimant choice an imperfect 
indicator of the inherent value of process, measures could be used to push 
or pull claimants into the appropriate track. 
i.  Status Quo Bias As a Sifting Mechanism 
First, and most importantly, all claimants could be placed into the 
“participation” track by default, but given incentives to opt into the 
“efficiency” track, such as the promise of a faster and cheaper appeals 
process.  Claimants do not receive payment until the conclusion of a 
hearing in their favor, so a faster, cheaper track would offer claimants not 
only the certainty of an earlier decision and ability to lower expenses, but 
also the added time value of the funds at issue.  This would incentivize 
rational wealth-maximizing claimants who perceive little inherent benefit in 
a live hearing to opt into the efficiency track.  Placing claimants into the 
participation track by default, however, would counteract claimants’ 
tendency to “purchase” too little process by leveraging “status quo bias.” 
“Status quo bias” is the behavioral economic term169 for the tendency of 
a person to follow the default path of least resistance even if “opting in” to a 
different path would be in that person’s financial best interest.170  For those 
subject to status quo bias, default rules act functionally as mandates.171  But 
for some actors, the default is just that—a default—and for these actors the 
default is not paternalistic at all.172  Because a default rule functions as a 
mandate only for those who are subject to status quo bias, it is 
“asymmetrically paternalistic.”173 
Status quo bias actually reflects several phenomena that tend to cause 
people to follow the default—in behavioral parlance, to make the default 
 
 169. Because all of the identified reasons for following the status quo are perfectly 
rational (even the endowment effect presumably creates a genuine preference), see supra 
notes 158–63 and accompanying text, the appellation “bias” is misleading.  The common 
term is nonetheless used here for clarity. 
 170. Russell Korobkin, Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
608, 625 (1997).  Status quo bias has been shown to have a major effect on decision making 
in diverse contexts, from class action participation to organ donation to savings. Eric J. 
Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCIENCE 1338, 1338 (2003) 
(reporting that organ donation rates increase close to 100 percent under opt-out regime). See 
generally John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving 
Outcomes:  Evidence from the United States, in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING 
ENVIRONMENT 167 (Jeffery R. Brown et al. eds., 2009) (participation in savings plan jumped 
from 60 percent to 95 percent under opt-out regime; savings rates across board were aligned 
with default rate); cf. Gretchen B. Chapman et al., Opting In Vs. Opting Out of Influenza 
Vaccination, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 43, 43 (2010) (noting that opt out flu vaccine achieved 
45 percent participation compared to 33 percent for opt in, a 36 percent relative increase). 
 171. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1599. 
 172. Camerer et al., supra note 20, at 1224. 
 173. See id. at 1219. 
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“stick”:  (1) the endowment effect, which causes a person to value what she 
possesses more than what she does not possess, all else being equal;174 (2) a 
signaling effect, because those with limited information take the default to 
reflect the policymaker’s (or public’s) opinion about the best option;175 (3) 
a reputational effect, where a person worries about how others will perceive 
her if she opts out; and (4) inertia resulting from bounded rationality, where 
a person with finite attention chooses not to waste mental resources 
considering a departure from a status quo that she perceives to be 
adequate.176 
The status quo will be least sticky for those Medicare claimants who 
stand to benefit least from procedural protections for two reasons.  First, 
assuming that behavioral biases correlate, the other market failures that 
would tend to distort the demand for process downward—limited 
information and projection bias—are likely to be most present for those 
claimants who are also subject to status quo bias. 
Second, several of the factors that make a default stick overlap with the 
factors that indicate enhanced inherent process value (on either a 
psychological or deontological theory) among Medicare claimants noted in 
Part II.  A corporate entity is both less likely to be susceptible to status quo 
bias (because it is less susceptible to the endowment effect)177 and less 
likely to derive inherent benefit from participation.  Similarly, a repeat 
player is both less likely to be susceptible to status quo bias (because it has 
a heightened incentive to become and remain informed, counteracting the 
default’s signaling and inertia effects) and less likely to derive inherent 
benefit from participation.  So, too, providers are both less likely to be 
susceptible to status quo bias (because they are in a better position to be 
informed about the process)178 and less likely to derive inherent benefit 
from participation. 
 
 174. Korobkin, supra note 170, at 625 (modeling status quo bias as resulting from 
endowment effect). 
 175. See Beshears et al., supra note 170, at 2; David Tannenbaum & Peter H. Ditto, 
Default Behavior As Social Inference (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 176. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:  Inertia in 401(k) 
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1149, 1149 (2000) (“‘[D]efault’ 
behavior appears to result both from participant inertia and from many employees taking the 
default as investment advice on the part of the company.”). 
 177. See Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal 
Intervention?  The Debiasing Effect of Institutions 3 (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2473758&download=yes (stating that “institutions that divide responsibility 
debias”) [http://perma.cc/E3KC-MVYA]. 
 178. That is not to say that providers or their attorneys are immune to behavioral 
phenomena.  Physicians, for example, have been shown to suffer from optimism bias. See 
Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians:  A Behavioral Economics 
Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189, 1197 (2008) (discussing physician tendency toward 
optimism bias and other behavioral phenomena).  But on net, economically motivated and 
sophisticated providers are less likely to be susceptible to behavioral bias than patients.  And, 
in any event, physician appeals represent only 13 percent of provider appeals; most are 
brought by hospitals, nursing homes, and durable medical equipment manufacturers. See 
2012 OIG REPORT, supra note 19, at 23. 
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As for magnitude, various studies show evidence of behavioral bias 
among patients,179 and status quo bias appears to persist even among those 
who have already made the decision to “opt in” to an appeal.180  But to 
minimize the risk that claimants who would benefit from procedural 
protections opt out, the choice could be presented in a way designed to 
enhance its stickiness, that is, its tendency to be followed.  This could be 
done both by making opt out difficult (we could require a separate letter, 
rather than a check box)181 and by framing the choice to discourage opt 
out.182 
Indeed, if necessary to maximize the stickiness of the participation track, 
the option of pursuing a claim through the efficiency track could be left out 
of the notice that claimants receive describing their appeal rights.  Like the 
“secret menu” at In-N-Out Burger, which is not posted on the restaurant’s 
menu but rather known only by word-of-mouth, the efficiency track could 
be an option only for those claimants who affirmatively seek it out or have 
access to Medicare regulations and payment policies.  This highly 
conservative approach to rationing should be employed only if early 
experience indicates a high rate of erroneous opt-ins to the efficiency track. 
ii.  Targeted Incentives As a Sifting Mechanism 
While status quo bias could be leveraged as a primary means of sorting 
claimants, additional means could be employed as well.  A second sorting 
mechanism could be the use of incentives designed disproportionately to 
encourage repeat players, or those appealing multiple claims, to opt in to 
the efficiency track.  Such entities are capable of benefiting from economies 
of scale in a way that one-off claimants are not.  So the efficiency route 
 
 179. See Keith Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, Heuristics and Heterogeneity in Health 
Insurance Exchanges:  Evidence from the Massachusetts Connector, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 
493, 494 (2012) (explaining how heuristics affect purchasing behavior); Halpern & Arnold, 
supra note 159, at 1709–10; Loewenstein, supra note 159, at 98; George F. Loewenstein, 
Costs and Benefits of Health- and Retirement-Related Choice, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
MEDICARE:  INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 87 (Shelia Burke et 
al. eds., 2000); Jane C. Weeks et al., Relationship Between Cancer Patients’ Predictions of 
Prognosis and Their Treatment Preferences, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1709, 1712 (1998). 
 180. Low appeal rates persist through multi-tiered healthcare coverage appeal processes 
despite high win rates at each tier and low barriers to appeal. See generally Interim Final 
Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal Claims and 
Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection & Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330 (July 23, 2010) (describing low appeal rate at each stage despite 
high success rate at subsequent stages). 
 181. See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt Out:  An Economic Theory of Altering 
Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012). 
 182. For example, the choice might be framed as a decision to forego a benefit rather than 
a decision among two equal routes, perhaps as a choice to “forfeit procedural rights.” Cf. 
Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default, 29 BERKELEY. TECH. L.J. 61, 110 (2013) 
(discussing situations under which profit-interested parties with power to do so trigger 
slippery defaults by framing).  Also, a hearing date could be identified immediately upon 
appeal, so as to make the foregone hearing appear even more as a concrete loss to an 
appellant. Cf. Bertrand et al., supra note 108, at 419 (finding that students were more likely 
to follow through on a medical appointment if given a meeting date in advance). 
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should offer enhanced opportunities to take advantage of these, like 
exclusive aggregation mechanisms for consolidation and class treatment.  
This would give many financially motivated entities a targeted reason to opt 
for the efficiency route. 
b.  Behavioral Approach Evaluated 
The behavioral approach carries the benefit of not relying on claimants to 
correctly choose the right amount of process, but poses equivalent costs. 
Accuracy:  Like the market-based and mandatory approaches, a 
behavioral approach would have no effect on accuracy so long as 
participation and accuracy are unbundled as described in Part IV.B and 
adverse selection in avoided with a once-a-year opt-in rule as described in 
Part IV.C.1. 
Participation value:  Because it counteracts the tendency of claimants to 
opt for insufficient procedural protections, the behavioral approach would 
come with lower potential participation costs than a libertarian approach.  
At the same time, it would have diminished potential benefits because it 
would sift fewer claimants into the efficiency track than the libertarian and 
paternalistic approaches.  These potential participation benefits and costs 
are discussed at greater length below in Part IV.C.4. 
Effect on primary behavior:  Like a purely libertarian approach, a 
behavioral approach would have no effect on claimants’ primary behavior. 
Transaction cost:  As with a purely libertarian approach, the behavioral 
approach would require a modest investment to give claimants a credible 
guarantee that the participation track did not offer a greater likelihood of 
success. 
Legality:  Like a purely libertarian approach, a behavioral approach is 
legal and could be implemented without a statutory change. 
4.  Participation Value of Rationing Approaches Compared 
Which approach to rationing process, if any, should Medicare use in lieu 
of a one-size-fits-all approach?  All of the approaches discussed above 
would create substantial monetary savings by directing the significant 
subset of Medicare claimants for whom participation creates no value into 
the efficiency track.  One in three Medicare coverage appeals is filed by a 
repeat player who files dozens of times each year, and many others are filed 
by large, corporate provider entities that file appeals as a routine part of 
their business.  To the extent that hearings provided to such claimants are 
wasted, all of the methods of rationing process discussed above would 
create value by eliminating that waste.  This value, in turn, could be used to 
enhance the participation value produced by the system overall either by 
reducing the current delay for claimants who seek a hearing, reintroducing 
to the participation track participatory protections that have been cut in the 
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interest of efficiency, like live (as opposed to telephone) hearings,183 or by 
making it possible for consumer advocates and representatives to bring 
more claims.184 
That benefit would come at the cost of the foregone benefit of a live 
hearing to those claimants sifted into the efficiency track.185  For those who 
derive zero inherent benefit from participation, this will be zero.  But that 
will not be the case for everyone.  Some claimants directed to the efficiency 
track will derive diminished participation value as a result and, in the case 
of egregious sifting errors, they will derive quite a lot of diminished 
participation.  This participation cost must be weighed against the 
participation benefits created by rationing in order to determine whether 
triage is worthwhile. 
In order to decide whether the participation benefits of any triage 
approach outweigh the participation costs, and by how much, we must first 
determine the benefit to those in the participation track of the added 
protections made possible by the cost savings of triage.  Then, we must 
weigh this benefit against the cost to those in the efficiency track of 
receiving efficiency-track procedures rather than the procedural protections 
they would have received under a one-size-fits-all regime.  The tilt of this 
balance will ultimately be the function of two differentials:  the differential 
between the participatory protections provided on each track, on the one 
 
 183. For example, Medicare offers telephonic hearings by default, allowing a claimant to 
obtain a videoconference only upon a showing of need and allowing in-person appearance at 
one of the four ALJ offices nationwide (in Ohio, California, Florida, and Virginia) only upon 
a showing of extraordinary need. CTR. FOR MEDICARE ADVOCACY, WHEN IS A HEARING NOT 
A HEARING? (2013), http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/old-site/News/Archives/Reform 
_InPersonHearings.htm#_edn2 [http://perma.cc/DBW4-TPXP].  This is in contrast to the 
social security appeals system, which features 168 hearing offices spread throughout the 
country and offers an in-person hearing as of right. Information About SSA’s Office of 
Disability Adjudication and Review, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa.gov/appeals/about 
_odar.html [http://perma.cc/Y34R-R7A5].  Research in procedural justice suggests that 
interaction with an adjudicator is a component of a claimant’s perception of the fairness of 
an adjudication. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice:  
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERS. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 952, 957–58 (1990) (describing that perception of procedural fairness depended in 
part on body language and tone of adjudicator). 
 184. By making it possible to bring an appeal without paying costs associated with a live 
hearing, the availability of the efficiency track would increase the number of appeals that 
consumer advocates, providers, or for-profit attorneys could bring.  Because of the 
complexity of medical decision making and stress of sickness, such intermediaries are even 
more likely to be a necessary prerequisite to access when it comes to Medicare appeals than 
they are in other adjudicatory contexts. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure, Agents, and 
Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL THEORETICAL ECON. 56, 68–69 (2011). 
 185. This analysis assumes that a prompt live hearing produces more participation value 
than a delayed live hearing and that any live hearing produces more participation value than 
a paper hearing. Compare Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel 
and Access to Justice:  A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J 473, 482 n.21 
(2010) (finding that moderate delay did not significantly impact claimants’ perceptions of 
procedural fairness), with Lind et al., supra note 183, at 957–58 (perception of fairness 
depended in part on interaction with adjudicator).  If that assumption is flawed—if paper 
hearings in fact produce more inherent participation value, say, because claimants find live 
hearings to be humiliating—then Medicare should simply eliminate live hearings for all 
claimants. 
120 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
hand, and the differential between the capacity to benefit from participation 
of the claimants sifted onto each track, on the other. 
The participation differential between the tracks will depend on (1) the 
cost savings associated with processing a claim through the efficiency track, 
(2) the improvements to the participation track that can be made using those 
cost savings, (3) the diminished participation value potentially created by 
the efficiency-track procedures, and (4) the enhanced participation value 
potentially created by the participation-track procedures.  For example, if 
the experience on the efficiency track is much worse than what would 
otherwise have been provided under a one-size-fits-all approach but 
generates only enough savings to make a modest improvement to the 
participation track, then it is unlikely (but not impossible) that triage will 
produce a net benefit.  The diminished participation value for those 
claimants who are sifted into the efficiency track may simply be too great. 
Note that the participation differential between the tracks will tend to be 
greater than one, that is, the decreased potential to generate participation 
value associated with efficiency-track procedures will tend to be greater 
than the associated increase in potential to generate participation value 
associated with the participation track.  This is true so long as the marginal 
benefits of additional investment in participation are diminishing, because 
under this assumption, the drop-off from the status quo to the efficiency-
track process will be greater than the associated step up from the status quo 
to the participation track.  Therefore, for rationing among claimants (rather 
than treating all claimants the same) to be worthwhile, the participation 
differential between the claimants on each track must also be greater than 
one.  For the same reason, the sorting rule must be better than random, so 
much so that the participation differential of the tracks is offset. 
As a result, the difference between the capacity to benefit from 
procedural protections of the claimants sifted into the efficiency track, on 
the one hand, and the capacity to benefit from procedural protections of the 
claimants sifted into the participation track, on the other—the participation 
differential between the claimants on each track—will also control the 
analysis.  It will depend on:  (1) the percentage of claimants for whom 
participation has substantially diminished value, and (2) the quality of our 
sorting mechanism to sift only those claimants into the efficiency track.  If 
the participation differential between the efficiency-track procedures and a 
one-size-fits-all approach is much greater than the differential between the 
one-size-fits-all approach and the participation track, triage may 
nonetheless be worthwhile if the difference between the claimants on each 
track is even greater.  To take an extreme example, imagine that only 
claimants who derive zero value from procedural protections are directed 
into the efficiency track, and those left on the participation track have a 
strong capacity to benefit from procedural protections.  In such a case, 
triage will improve participation even if the efficiency track makes extreme 
procedural sacrifices in order to generate only a tiny improvement to the 
experience of those on the participation track. 
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In Medicare, it is possible to break down the cost side of the participation 
differential between the tracks.  If the efficiency track offers paper hearings 
rather than long-delayed live hearings (the status quo), then for every two 
claimants sifted into the efficiency track, the process can provide one 
prompt hearing to a claimant on the participation track.186  That is because a 
paper hearing costs about half as much as a live hearing before an ALJ.187 
The participation value side of this differential is harder to pinpoint.  
How much worse is a paper hearing than a long-delayed live hearing?  And 
how much better is a prompt live hearing than a long-delayed one?  The 
cliché that “justice delayed is justice denied” suggests that a prompt live 
hearing is much better than a multi-year wait.  But how does that benefit 
match up against the lost opportunity for a “day in court” associated with a 
paper hearing?  It is hard to say.  That does not mean, however, that it is not 
possible to conclude that procedural triage would improve Medicare’s 
administrative process. 
The participation differential between the claimants in the efficiency 
track and participation track that would result from triage is not as elusive.  
The libertarian, paternalistic, and behavioral approaches to rationing 
process can be thought of along a spectrum, from more conservative to 
more aggressive.  The behavioral approach is the most conservative, 
tailored to sift only those claimants for whom a hearing has little or no 
value into the efficiency track.  It would weed out low-value claimants from 
the participation track, directing a moderate number of claimants to that 
track, while ensuring that such claimants were those for whom participation 
is wasted or at least low value.  Next comes the libertarian, forced-choice 
approach, which would sift many more claimants into the efficiency track, 
potentially netting a greater benefit but posing an increased potential for 
diminished overall participation value as a result.  This approach would 
“cherry pick” high-value claimants onto the participation track.  And last 
comes the most aggressive, mandatory approach, which would sift all 
providers—the vast majority of claimants—into the efficiency track, cherry 
picking even more directly. 
Therefore, it is safest to conclude that the behavioral approach to sorting 
claimants would produce a substantial net increase to the overall 
participation value produced by Medicare’s process.188  By defaulting all 
 
 186. This two-to-one ratio, based on the cost difference between an ALJ hearing and a 
private sector hearing, reflects the conservative assumption that the constraint on additional 
process—what makes hearings scarce—is the monetary cost of hearings.  To the extent that 
the constraint on additional hearings is actually the practical feasibility of hiring additional 
ALJs, rather than the cost of doing so, every paper hearing allows us to provide one 
additional ALJ hearing, so the ratio would be one-to-one. 
 187. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 188. The behavioral approach would add overall participation value so long as the sum of 
the participation value of an efficiency-track appeal multiplied by the capacity to benefit 
from participation of claimants directed to the efficiency track and the participation value of 
a participation-track appeal multiplied by the capacity to benefit from participation of 
claimants directed to the participation track was greater than the participation value 
produced by the status quo (a long-delayed hearing) multiplied by the capacity to benefit 
from participation of the average claimant.  In Medicare, given current costs, every two 
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claimants onto the participation track, the behavioral approach would avoid 
the biases that undermine the effectiveness of a libertarian approach.  But 
by incentivizing all claimants—and especially repeat players—to opt in to 
the efficiency track, it would sift onto the efficiency track the core group of 
claimants for whom procedural protections are wasted.  Furthermore, 
because status quo bias and propensity to benefit from procedural 
protections are correlated, the number of claimants for whom a hearing 
would have significant inherent value, but who would nonetheless 
mistakenly opt out, should be small. 
That said, those who are dubious about the inherent value of participation 
in the first place will tend to support an even more aggressive approach to 
rationing that comes with the potential for greater net overall benefit, such 
as the forced choice or mandatory approaches, even while risking 
diminished participation overall.  Similarly, those who doubt that providers 
ever derive inherent value from being heard will support the legal changes 
necessary for a paternalistic approach, and those who are confident that a 
paper hearing is likely just as good or almost as good as a live hearing, will 
also support a more aggressive approach. 
In sum, Medicare should respond to the ongoing backlog by 
implementing a behavioral approach to procedural triage as described 
above.  This would allow the claimants who really need it to receive 
something closer to an uncompromised hearing, without adversely affecting 
the overall accuracy of the administrative process or seriously threatening to 
deny hearings erroneously.  The result would be a more just—or more 
modestly, a less unjust—administrative process. 
V.  PROCEDURAL TRIAGE BEYOND MEDICARE 
The study of Medicare in Parts II through IV showed that Medicare could 
make the most of its scarce procedural resources by rationing process 
among claimants based on need, that is, by engaging in procedural triage.  
But the framework developed through that study for determining whether 
and how to engage in procedural triage in Medicare can also tell us whether 
and how procedural triage would improve other adjudicatory systems.  This 
part synthesizes and generalizes that framework, then shows how it can be 
used to identify other potential candidates for procedural triage. 
A.  Framework 
First, the inherent value of participation must vary from claimant to 
claimant because there is no reason to ration procedural protections among 
claimants based on need in an adjudicatory process for which this is not the 
case.  This consideration will eliminate only those adjudicatory processes 
 
efficiency-track appeals would enable one prompt (rather than delayed) hearing.  This would 
be true, for example, if (1) the drop-off in participation from a delayed hearing to a paper 
hearing is smaller than the increased participation of a prompt hearing instead of a delayed 
one, and (2) efficiency-track claimants have less than half the capacity to benefit from 
participation of participation-track claimants. 
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that are made up of very similar claimants.  For example, highly 
particularized adjudicatory processes featuring universally substantial 
process value considerations, such as the one for resolution of habeas 
corpus petitions for enemy non-combatants imprisoned at Guantanamo 
Bay,189 are poor candidates for procedural triage.  So too are adjudicatory 
processes that resolve claims among highly sophisticated, corporate actors 
that may generate no inherent process value in the first place. 
Second, absent perfect information, procedural protections must be 
scarce.  Otherwise, triage will be subject to the objection that it is merely a 
new way to sacrifice participation for efficiency.  As with the requirement 
of variation, this condition does not eliminate many adjudicatory processes.  
Medicare is hardly the first administrative process to struggle with a claims 
backlog,190 or the procedural scarcity that causes it.  Indeed, making the 
most of limited procedural resources is the defining challenge of many 
adjudicatory systems:  social security,191 veterans’ benefits,192 workers’ 
compensation,193 private health insurance coverage disputes,194 and, 
increasingly, even civil justice in the federal courts.195 
Wherever these two boundary conditions—variation and scarcity—are 
present, procedural triage could potentially add value.  However, in order to 
realize that potential, a normatively and legally permissible means of triage 
must be found that creates more value than it costs.  The five considerations 
identified in Part IV.A—effect on accuracy, participation value, effect on 
primary behavior, transaction cost, and legality—are a starting place for any 
such cost-benefit analysis, and the libertarian, behavioral, and paternalistic 
 
 189. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
 190. See, e.g., Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 369 n.28 (2014) (describing backlog of 
asylum appeals before Board of Immigration Appeals); Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling 
Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1288–89 (2014) (detailing backlog 
of veterans’ disability claims before Department of Veterans’ Affairs); Robert G. Bone, The 
Process of Making Process:  Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural 
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 904 (1999) (explaining that Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
made changes to rulemaking for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure designed to “address 
problems of case backlog”); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal 
Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 501–06 
(1987) (noting backlog of civil rights claims before Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and Department of Justice’s Office of Civil Rights); Daniel F. Solomon, 
Fundamental Fairness, Judicial Efficiency, and Uniformity:  Revisiting the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 52, 95 (2013) (noting backlog of 
social security disability claims); David B. Torrey, Master or Chancellor?  The Workers’ 
Compensation Judge and Adjudicatory Power, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 21, 
85–104 (2012) (reviewing various state agencies’ responses to backlog of workers’ 
compensation claims); Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to 
Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 752–53 (2003) 
(explicating backlogs in social security and veterans’ disability determination processes). 
 191. MASHAW, supra note 2, at 134–35. 
 192. Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. 
REV. 388, 418–19 (2011). 
 193. See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 190, at 85–104. 
 194. See infra note 199. 
 195. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007). See generally 
Lahav, supra note 15, at 592–93; Miller, supra note 15, at 42–44. 
124 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
approaches discussed in Part IV.C are a starting place for thinking about 
possible sorting mechanisms.  In determining the effect of a triage regime 
on participation value, which may be a driving consideration, the approach 
to maximizing participation value offered in Part IV.C—comparing the 
participation differential of the procedural tracks to the participation 
differential of the claimants on each track—could also serve as a starting 
point.  Adjudicatory systems beyond Medicare, however, may present 
additional considerations or possibilities not identified in this Article’s 
analysis of Medicare.196 
B.  Triaging Claimants in Spite of Imperfect Information 
If we had perfect information and cared only about social welfare, then 
we could say with precision whether and how to engage in procedural triage 
anywhere that the value of participation varies among claimants.  Clear 
signals, however, are likely to be rare.  Imperfect information is a defining 
challenge of the administrative state, so it will likely be the usual case that 
our information about the value of participation to claimants will be 
imperfect at best. 
Administrators are often tasked with making the most of scarce 
resources—from safety to healthcare to food stamps to vaccines—
notwithstanding a deficit of information about how those resources actually 
benefit the people to whom they might be distributed.  In doling out 
entitlements, including procedural entitlements, administrators must make 
do anyway, or settle for a one-size-fits-all approach that is worse than 
second best. 
This Article has shown that with careful attention to context, we can do 
just that, i.e., we can make procedural triage a component of a better, if still 
imperfect, administrative process.  Specifically, it has shown that we can 
identify traits that tend to correlate with heightened participation value and 
use behavioral economic tools to direct procedural protections to claimants 
with those traits. 
In many cases, identification of a factor that tends to correlate with 
process value alone is unlikely to be enough.  Any sorting mechanism that 
relies on mere tendencies will come with a high rate of error costs, diluting 
the benefit of sorting and limiting the number of contexts in which doing so 
is worth the candle. 
Two additional features of the Medicare coverage appeals process made 
it a particularly apt context for sorting based on limited information about 
tendencies alone.  First, participatory protections are not the most cost-
 
 196. For example, for Medicare claimants, the determinants of variation on a 
psychological theory of participation value corresponded with the determinants of variation 
on a deontological theory, so it was not necessary to collapse the two in order to say that the 
default (or another) approach would increase participation value overall.  Where this is not 
the case, any attempt at procedural triage would need to take on this problematic task. See 
generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, Preference, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions, 
32 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 304 (2003) (offering objections to efforts to incorporate 
deontological “fairness” considerations with more mundane tastes). 
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effective way to promote accuracy in Medicare.197  That fact—the 
inefficiency of participatory hearings in Medicare—is why Medicare can 
ration process without creating accuracy costs. 
Second, the distribution of claimants in the Medicare coverage appeals 
process, in terms of their capacity to benefit from procedural protections, 
was both wide and lump—in economic terms, multi-modal—with process 
tending to be more valuable for one group and less valuable for another.  
Specifically, a significant minority of claimants in the Medicare coverage 
appeals process are highly sophisticated providers who appeal a significant 
number of claims as part of the day-to-day operation of their business.  
Such claimants derive significantly less, if any, inherent benefit from 
participation.  On the other hand, a small minority of claimants are 
unsophisticated beneficiaries who tend to derive significant benefit from 
process. 
Such a wide and lumpy distribution of claimants (in terms of their 
capacity to benefit from participation) lessens the error cost of sorting while 
increasing the benefits.  A sorting rule that separates somewhat inaccurately 
between groups will produce fewer errors on both sides than an equally 
accurate sorting rule used to sort claimants in a uniform distribution.  So, all 
else being equal, the error costs of separating claims for which procedural 
protections are worthwhile from those for which procedural protections are 
not worthwhile, is much lower when the distribution of claims is lumpy.  
Similarly, the wider the variation among claimants, the larger the potential 
gains from rationing.  As a result, with all else being equal, procedural 
triage is more likely to be worthwhile in an adjudicatory process that 
features a wide and lumpy (multi-modal) distribution of claimants (in terms 
of their capacity to benefit from participation). 
Therefore, in looking for other administrative processes that are good 
candidates for procedural triage, future research should pay special attention 
to processes in which (1) participation is inefficient, and (2) the distribution 
of claimants is wide and lumpy.  The former factor will apply in most 
adjudicatory processes because, as procedure scholars know well, the most 
efficient process is rarely the most participatory, and vice versa.198 
As for the second factor, it also will apply in a significant subset of 
adjudicatory processes because the wide and lumpy distribution is 
common.199  For example, veterans’ benefits appeals,200 private sector 
 
 197. See supra Part IV.B. 
 198. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 141, at 2039 (“[A]ggregate litigation 
threatens legitimacy by replacing formal court hearings with impersonal, top-down 
bureaucracies that stray from democratic ideals.”); see also Lahav, supra note 15, at 415 
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 199. Marc Galanter noted decades ago that many adjudicatory processes feature a 
bimodal distribution of very different claimants, which he called the “haves” and “have 
nots.”  See Galanter, supra note 7, at 103–04; supra text accompanying note 7. 
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healthcare coverage determinations,201 and U.S. Department of Agriculture 
loan and crop insurance determinations all fit this pattern.202 
C.  Procedural Triage in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Perhaps the most well studied adjudicatory system where participatory 
protections are not the most cost-effective way to promote accuracy and the 
cast of claimants varies widely203—and therefore the most well-known 
candidate for procedural triage—is the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This section, therefore, briefly surveys the potential for procedural triage 
in federal court.  Procedural triage offers a new way of rationing process in 
federal court, as elaborated upon in Part V.C.1 below, and a new way of 
assessing the value of existing rules of civil procedure, as elaborated upon 
 
 200. Many veterans’ pension appeals are brought pro se, but many others are brought by 
appeal mills that bring claims en masse on behalf of absentee claimants. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, VETERANS’ PENSION BENEFITS:  IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO 
ENSURE ONLY QUALIFIED VETERANS AND SURVIVORS RECEIVE BENEFITS 29–32 (2012) 
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of this Article—the Veterans’ Benefits Administration could consider rationing process 
among claimants.  A danger in doing so is that a sorting rule that treats represented claimants 
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rationing process in veterans’ benefits appeals would likely need to rely on a default rule. 
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except that utilization review is more common and more often takes place before treatment is 
administered.  But appellants in this process are never entitled to a live hearing, in person or 
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acceptance of rationing decisions. See William M. Sage, Managed Care’s Crimea:  Medical 
Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health 
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Lawyers As Healers, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 376 (2007), or to take assignment 
of appeal rights, in order to increase the volume of claims and insulate beneficiaries from 
denials.  This would provide a needed boost to the accuracy benefit of the appeals process. 
See Vukadin, supra note 144, at 1237.  Simultaneously, appeal rights should be expanded to 
include a hearing, at least by telephone, to improve the capacity of appeals to generate 
acceptance. Zimerman & Tyler, supra note 185, at 482–83.  Both changes could be made 
without creating an intractable administrative burden by adopting a two-track process and 
rationing mechanism along the lines of the behavioral approach this Article has suggested be 
adopted by Medicare. 
 202. The agriculture industry is largely split between big business and small farmers.  
When it comes to USDA determinations affecting market participants in this industry, 
however, we currently provide a one-size-fits-all adjudicatory process. See Gary Condra & 
Merinda Condra, The Basics of the USDA National Appeals Division, 73 TEX. B.J. 396, 396 
(2010). 
 203. Gillian Hadfield has noted the disparity in federal courts between organizational and 
individual claimants. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of 
Civil Litigation:  Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the 
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1280–84 (2005) (presenting 
“preliminary data on the differences between individual and organizational litigants in the 
disposition of federal civil cases”). 
2015] PROCEDURAL TRIAGE 127 
in Part V.C.2 below.  The potential to improve the administration of civil 
justice in federal court through procedural triage is somewhat limited, 
however, by the requirement that federal rules be transsubstantive, as 
discussed in Part V.C.3. 
1.  An Alternative to Claim-Based Rationing 
Procedural reforms in federal court over the past several decades—“from 
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal”—have tended overwhelmingly to sacrifice 
participation for the sake of efficiency.204  The most significant of such 
reforms may be the growth of summary judgment, thanks to Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett’s205 teaching that the mechanism is not disfavored.206  Cases 
susceptible to summary judgment are decided by a judge, often purely on 
the papers, rather than by a jury after a literal day, or perhaps days, in court. 
A more recent reform that may also prove momentous is the plausibility 
pleading requirement announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.207  The 
pleading standard creates a new route by which a case may be decided by a 
judge rather than a jury and differs from summary judgment in that the 
decision comes prior to discovery rather than after. 
These reforms respond to the perception of scarcity and inefficiency in 
federal court by rationing process among claims based on the perceived 
accuracy benefit of additional process.  Because we think there are not 
enough resources to provide every civil litigant a jury trial, summary 
judgment saves the jury trial for the claims—not claimants—in which the 
jury trial’s fact-finding function appears to be needed most.  Similarly, 
because we think there are not enough resources to provide every civil 
litigant with discovery, Twombly’s plausibility pleading requirement saves 
discovery for those claims—again, not claimants—for which discovery is 
most likely to yield proof. 
Procedural triage offers an alternative approach to rationing process in 
federal court.  Rather than direct procedural protections to the claims for 
which they are most valuable, we might direct them to the claimants for 
whom they are most valuable. 
For example, assume that a claimant who sues soon after an event is 
more likely to be pursuing an emotionally-loaded grievance than a claimant 
who sleeps on her rights for years and that research discovers this tendency 
to be pronounced.208  If so, we might forbid summary judgment in civil 
actions filed within two months of the plaintiff’s discovery of her injury, 
thereby providing especially motivated claimants direct access to the 
participation track in federal court.  Such a staggered limitations period 
would ration access to a jury trial not (or not only) based on the perceived 
 
 204. See Miller, supra note 15, at 9–10. 
 205. 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
 206. Id. at 327. 
 207. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 208. Due to hedonic adaptation—the tendency for an adverse emotional reaction to fade 
over time—this assumption is a plausible one. See John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation 
and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1517 (2008). 
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accuracy benefit of a jury trial in a particular case, but instead (or also) on 
the perceived meaning of a “day in court” to a particular claimant (or 
claimants). 
Of course, the desirability and feasibility of rationing procedural 
protections in federal court using a staggered limitations period, or any 
other method of triaging claimants, are complicated questions that call for 
additional scholarly inquiry.  This Article has explored only variation in the 
inherent value of process to claimants, not defendants.  In private lawsuits 
in federal court, the inherent value of process for both sides of the “v” must 
be taken into account. 
Ultimately, the superiority vel non of procedural triage as an alternative 
to summary judgment or pleading requirements will depend not only on our 
ability to identify permissible means to ration process among claimants 
using the framework discussed above, but also on our assessment of the 
ability of judges to ration process correctly using claim-based approaches.  
Those who take a sanguine view of summary judgment and pleading may 
tend to favor claim-based approaches to rationing process in federal court, 
while those who take a dim view of judges’ ability to sort wheat from chaff 
through summary judgment may tend to see procedural triage as a 
potentially less-bad response to process scarcity in federal court. 
2.  Possible Triaging Effect of Existing Rules 
Furthermore, even rules of procedure that are not consciously intended to 
ration process among claimants may nonetheless have the effect of doing 
so.  Future research should be attentive to the possibility of such effects, 
which may or may not be salutary.  For example, at the pleading stage, 
federal courts show special solicitude for pro se claimants, applying a lower 
pleading threshold to their claims.209  This preference could be justified as a 
way of rationing process among claimants if it turns out that lack of 
representation or direct claimant involvement correlates with heightened 
participation value.  Indeed, even constitutional standing doctrine may 
come with the benefit of rationing process among claimants, 
notwithstanding its constitutional origins, to the extent that those with an 
injury fairly traceable to a challenged action derive more participation value 
from a lawsuit than those without such an injury.210 
On the other hand, some rules may have the previously unrecognized 
cost of denying procedural protections to the very claimants who stand to 
benefit most from such protections.  For example, many courts provide in-
person oral argument only to those claimants who affirmatively opt in by 
indicating “oral argument requested” at the top of a motion.211  To the 
 
 209. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (pleading by pro se litigants “must be held 
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 210. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (constitutional test for 
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by placing ‘Oral Argument Requested’ immediately below the title of a motion or the 
response to a motion.”). 
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extent that status quo bias—and ignorance of local rules—is most common 
among federal civil claimants who would tend to derive most inherent 
benefit from airing their grievance before a judge—as they are among 
Medicare claimants—such rules ration process in precisely the wrong way. 
3.  Procedural Triage and Transubstantivity 
Any intentional effort to ration process among claimants in federal court 
will need to confront a special requirement applicable there that limits the 
potential feasibility of procedural triage:  transubstantivity.  Unlike 
Medicare’s administrative process for resolving coverage appeals, or the 
administrative process for resolving veterans’ benefits appeals, federal 
courts endeavor to apply the same set of rules to a broad range of 
substantive claims.  Pursuant to the “transubstantivity” requirement 
embedded in the rules, federal courts are supposed to apply the same 
procedures to an employment action, a routine motor vehicle tort claim, a 
constitutional claim, a corporate contract dispute, and so on. 
The transubstantivity requirement makes procedural triage more difficult 
by significantly complicating the inquiry into whether particular claimant 
traits tend to indicate enhanced or diminished participation value.  Scholars 
have noted that the inherent value of participation may vary based on the 
type of substantive claim at issue (as opposed to who brings it and why).212  
This variation may be more pronounced for some claimants than others, 
such that a trait that indicates enhanced participation value for claimants 
bringing one sort of substantive claim may not do so when the underlying 
substantive claim is different, or might even tend to indicate diminished 
inherent value.  For example, the fact that a claimant has filed four prior 
suits may tend to indicate diminished participation value when the suits are 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  But, the fact of repeat filings 
may tend to do just the opposite when the suits all allege violation of 
constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.213  
Similarly, the chance to tell her story in court may be cathartic to an 
employee who feels her termination reflected racial prejudice, but have the 
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opposite effect for a sexual harassment victim, or vice versa.214  In order to 
evaluate whether treating claimants of one type differently would produce 
participation benefits, it would be necessary to know more about the 
magnitude of such tendencies and the frequency of such claims.  Learning 
that information, and incorporating it into the distribution of procedural 
protections, may be too difficult to be worthwhile. 
Finally, a robust literature has articulated various pros and cons of 
transubstantivity in procedure and has questioned the extent to which this 
supposed requirement should be (or is) merely aspirational.215  The fact that 
transubstantivity limits the feasibility of rationing process in federal court in 
the way just discussed stands as an additional “cost” that weighs against 
continued adherence to the transubstantivity requirement.  Whether this 
added weight tips the balance is beyond the scope of this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
In “mass justice” adjudication, as in healthcare, a dollar spent on a person 
unnecessarily is a dollar taken from someone who could have used it, 
perhaps desperately.  Yet, in Medicare we are wasting so much of our 
adjudication budget providing procedural justice for all, even though it only 
benefits some, that we cannot afford to give anyone a prompt hearing. 
As this Article has shown, we can construct better adjudicatory processes 
by tailoring the provision of scarce procedural protections to particular 
claimants, using streamlined processes to resolve the claims of those who 
benefit least simply from being heard and using those savings to enhance 
the opportunity for participation we give to the claimants a “day in court” 
benefits most.  And while limited information, market failures, and our 
background commitments to procedural justice make such rationing easier 
said than done in practice, we can use an asymmetrically paternalistic 
approach to separate the claimants who benefit least from a hearing from 
those who benefit most, making it possible to secure some of the benefits of 
procedural triage while avoiding the pitfalls. 
The result is an improved regulatory tool, better able to help us work 
through the hard choices that scarcity forces us to make.  In healthcare and 
far beyond, we could sure use it. 
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